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I. INTRODUCTION
Both the People's Republic of China (the "PRC" or "China") and
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ("Vietnam") are making the transition
from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy. An
effective bankruptcy law is an integral part of the institutional framework
necessary for this transition. China enacted the Law of the People's
Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation) on
December 2, 1986, and it came into operation on October 1, 1988 (the
"1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law").1 This law is applicable to State-Owned
Enterprises ("SOEs"). On April 9, 1991, the PRC Civil Procedure Law
was approved, 2 with Chapter XIX applying to the bankruptcy of non-SOE
enterprises with legal person status. The drafting of a bankruptcy law in
Vietnam followed from Article 15 of the 1992 Constitution of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which institutionalized the policy to
"promote the development of the multi-sector market-oriented economy
with... State management towards socialism." 4 The new bankruptcy law
' 43*),,Fvr R (iaAT) [Laws of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise
Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation)] (Dec. 2, 1986) [hereinafter the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law],
translated in Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Commission of the National People's
Congress (compilation), LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
LAWS 289-297) (1983-1986).
2 @X 4 IJ~ [PRC Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by Order No. 44 of the
President of the PRC on Apr, 9, 1991 and effective as of that date).
3 Another bankruptcy provision included in national legislation is art. 189 in Chapter VIII of the 'p
- LJlI iJ2 [PRC Company Law of 1993] (adopted on Dec. 29, 1993 and revised on
Dec. 25, 1999 and Aug. 28, 2004) [hereinafter the PRC Company Law] (for companies formed
under Chinese law). Also applicable to the bankruptcy of both SOE and non-SOE legal person
enterprises are various judicial interpretations, rules, and administrative decrees, such as the ZLk
Rali ( -TW {rhfM0,T] ) [Provisions of the Supreme People's Court
on Issues Concermng the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases] (promulgated on July 30, 2002 and
effective on September 1, 2002) [hereinafter the 2002 PRC Supreme People's Court Provisions].
Local insolvency procedures have also developed in many parts of China, e.g., in Shenzhen: see
Xianchu Zhang & Charles D. Booth, Chinese Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging Market Economy:
The Shenzhen Experience, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Zhang & Booth, Chinese
Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging Market Economy].
4 See RESEARCH TEAM (Chaired by Dr. Duong Dang Hue), RESEARCH REPORT, ASSESSMENT,
ANALYSIS, RESEARCH OF CURRENT STATUS To RECOMMEND ON COMPLETION OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS, Vietnamese Ministry of Justice, at Introduction
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was one of the laws that the Vietnamese began drafting later that year
with the goal of creating a "uniform, complete legal system." 5 The
drafting process moved quickly, and the Vietnamese Law on Enterprise
Bankruptcy (the "1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law") was enacted on
December 30, 1993, and took effect on July 1, 1994.6 This law rejected
the bifurcated Chinese approach of separate laws for SOEs and non-SOE
legal person enterprises in favor of a single law that applied to both SOEs
and non-SOE enterprises.7 It was also more expansive than the Chinese
approach in that it applied to both legal person and non-legal person
enterprises.
8
These laws did not live up to early expectations. By 1994, the
Chinese government had already decided to begin drafting a new national
bankruptcy law. From 1989 until 1994, the courts had accepted few
bankruptcy cases: 98 in 1989, 32 in 1990, 117 in 1991, 428 in 1992, and
478 in 1993. 9 In Vietnam, from July 1994 to September 2001, the number
of cases was even lower: the number of bankruptcy applications per year
never exceeded 30, and only 58 enterprises were adjudicated bankrupt by
the courts.' 0 Of these bankruptcies in China and Vietnam, the number of
cases that led to successful reorganizations was very low.11
(Vietnamese Ministry of Justice 2002) [hereinafter VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH
REPORT].
5Id.
6 Vietnamese Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Dec. 30, 1993) [hereinafter the 1993 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law], available at
httv://www.vietnamese-law-consultancy.com/sources/s bankcruotcy/bankcruptcv 05 98.htm. In
Vietnam, the bankruptcy law has also been supplemented by various judicial interpretations and
administrative decrees. See also VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note
4, at Part One, III ("Actual status of enterprise bankruptcy law in Vietnam").
' This followed on from the policy that all enterprises should be treated equally. VIETNAMESE
BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Introduction.
8 Id. at Part Three, II, 1 ("On applicable scale of the Bankruptcy Law").
9 According to the Statistics of the PRC Supreme People's Court in March 2001, cited in WANG
WEIGUO & CHARLES D. BOOTH, STUDY ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR DEBT
RESTRUCTURING OF ENTERPRISES IN CHINA 12 (World Bank Report for the State Economy and
Trade Commission of China, 2002). The statistics of the PRC Supreme People's Court are not
uniformly accepted. According to the statistics of the 1L,, -' [Beijing
Siyuan Merger and Bankruptcy Consultancy], as reported by ! 9,V [Cao Siyuan] in the
Implementation and Revision of the Bankruptcy System in China, a paper presented at INSOL China
2002, held in Beijing, China, (Oct. 9-1 I, 2002) [hereinafter Statistics of the Beijing Sijyuan Merger
and Bankruptcy Consultancy], there were 710 cases in 1993.
'0 Statistics of the Vietnamese Supreme People's Court, cited in VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW
RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Two, I, 1.1 ("Practice of Acceptance and Settlement of
Application for Declaration of Bankruptcy") and Introduction. However, the REPORT notes that the
statistical data provided by the Vietnamese Supreme People's Court was "incomplete." Id. Most of
the cases were from the larger provinces and cities (such as Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and Hai
Phong); some provinces reported no bankruptcies at all. Id. at Part Two, I, 2.2.
" Regarding China, see 3ET M, W 8 [WANG WEIGUO, BANKRUPTCY LAW] 220 (in Chinese,
1999) (the number of cases invoking the reorganization provisions in the law was close to zero);
regarding Vietnam, see VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part
Two, II, 1.1.1.
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For many years, both China and Vietnam have focused on how
best to improve these older laws and enact more modem insolvency
regimes. The Chinese government initiated a review of the Chinese
bankruptcy law in 1994, and a first draft was completed in 1995. After a
hiatus that was caused in part by a concern about the high level of
unemployment likely to be caused by allowing many SOEs to go into
bankruptcy, 12 the drafting process resumed in 1998. Further drafts of the
law were released for comment, including drafts in 2000, 2001, 2002, and
more recently, in June 2004 (respectively the "2000," "2001," "2002," or
"June 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law"). Roughly two-thirds of the
2002 draft was incorporated into the June 2004 draft. The June 2004
draft was submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on June 21, 2004; since then an even more recent draft has
emerged (the "October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law"). In effect,
the current version is a work in process. There remains a general hope
that a draft will be finalized by the middle of 2005 and come into
operation in 2006, but this is dependent on agreement being reached on
several issues that have proved to be intractable and which are discussed
below.
By June 2002, Vietnam had completed a draft bankruptcy law
(the "2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law"). When comparing the
2002 Vietnamese and Chinese drafts shortly after they were issued, it
appeared that the Vietnamese reform process was at an earlier stage; but
much progress was made in Vietnam over the next two years and a new
Vietnamese bankruptcy law, the Vietnamese Law on Bankruptcy, was
enacted on June 15, 2004 and came into operation on October 15, 2004
(the "2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law"). 13 The fact that Vietnam
enacted its new bankruptcy law before China did is significant because
during the drafting process the Vietnamese were interested in how the
Chinese government was dealing with similar issues of insolvency law
reform and the movement towards a market-oriented economy in the
Chinese draft law. 14 However, the Vietnamese were able to reach a
consensus more quickly than the Chinese have.
An earlier article I co-authored compared the 2002 draft Chinese
and Vietnamese laws and highlighted seven areas of the proposals.'5 The
present article provides an update on the insolvency reform processes in
12 Charles D. Booth, Chinese Insolvency Law: Developing an Insolvency Infrastructure, IPBA J. 13,
13 (Mar. 2001) (noting comments of *ik'F [Zhu Shao Ping], Chair of the Working Group for
Drafting the New Chinese Bankruptcy Law, Fiscal and Economic committee under the Standing of
the PRC National People's Congress).
13 Vietnamese Law on Bankruptcy, Law No. 21/2004/QHl1 [hereinafter the 2004 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law].
14 1 learned this first-hand when I conducted four days of workshops organized by the Vietnamese
Ministry of Justice, including two days with the Vietnamese bankruptcy law drafting committee, on
the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, in Hanoi, Vietnam, in June 2002.
" See Booth & Chiu in the note referenced to the title of this article.
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China and Vietnam since mid-2002. Part I sets out the overall insolvency
framework in China and Vietnam, and Parts II to VI consider five of the
areas discussed in the earlier piece - namely, the scope of the bankruptcy
laws; bankruptcy administration; corporate rehabilitation; priorities in
distribution and the protection of employees' interests; and cross-border
insolvency.1 6 This article identifies weaknesses in the current bankruptcy
law regime in China and in the former regime in Vietnam that the law
reform processes in both countries have addressed. It notes where the
October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law differs from the 2002
Chinese draft and highlights the areas that still need to be finalized. It
also identifies those areas in which the new 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy
Law differs from the 2002 Vietnamese draft and suggests where further
improvements could be made. Throughout the article, I will be drawing
comparisons between the Vietnamese and Chinese approaches.
II. INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK
Legal reforms in and of themselves are not sufficient to solve
insolvency problems. This is even truer in countries such as China and
Vietnam with economies in transition and systemic insolvency in some
state-owned sectors. For example, when trying to address the problems
with SOEs and state-owned banks, government officials must decide (1)
whether to enact laws such as formal court-centered liquidation and
corporate rescue laws to allow the market to sort out the problems; or (2)
to implement administrative reforms, such as the creation of Asset
Management Companies ("AMCs") to fulfill central or local government
policy directives, or a combination of the two. Viewing the bankruptcy
laws in China and Vietnam as but one part, albeit a very important part, of
this overall framework proves helpful in deciding what the proper scope
of these laws should be.
China
China's current insolvency framework is a patchwork of
overlapping structures including the following:17
(1) National bankruptcy laws and other legal provisions and
procedures. The two national bankruptcy laws are the 1986 Chinese
Bankruptcy Law for SOEs 18 and Chapter XIX of the PRC Civil Procedure
Law entitled Procedure for Bankruptcy and Debt Payment of Legal
Person Enterprises for non-SOE enterprises with legal person status.' 9
Article 206 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law excludes from the coverage
of Chapter XIX "non-legal person enterprises, individual businesses,
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lease-holding farm households and partnerships formed by private
individuals."2
0
China also has solvent liquidation procedures in Chapter VIII of
the PRC Company Law entitled Bankruptcy, Dissolution and Liquidation
of Companies for companies (limited liability companies and companies
limited by shares) formed under the PRC Company Law2 l and in the PRC
Liquidation Procedures of Foreign Investment Enterprises ("PRC
Liquidation Procedures of FIEs").2 2 Both the PRC Company Law and the
PRC Liquidation Procedures of FIEs include provisions for commencing
a bankruptcy case where in the course of the liquidation of the enterprise
it becomes apparent that the assets are insufficient to cover the debts:
Article 196 of the PRC Company Law and Article 27 of the PRC
Liquidation Procedures of FIEs each require the liquidation committee to
apply to the People's Court for a declaration of the bankruptcy of the
enterprise. Article 196 provides that after the People's Court has ruled to
declare the company bankrupt, the liquidation committee shall turn the
liquidation matters over to the court. Article 27, in a similar vein,
provides that if the enterprise is declared bankrupt in accordance with the
law, matters shall be handled in accordance with the laws and
administrative regulations concerning bankrupt liquidation. In other
words, Articles 196 and 27 take insolvent liquidations out of the company
law and FIE procedures and "feed" them into the bankruptcy provisions
under the PRC Civil Procedure Law. For FIEs, once the bankruptcy
declaration is made, the PRC Liquidation Procedures for FIEs are no
longer applicable. However, that is not the result for companies under the
PRC Company Law, because Article 189 of the PRC Company Law
provides:
Where a company is declared bankrupt according to law
because it is unable to pay off its due debts, a People's
Court shall, in accordance with relevant laws, organize the
17 For further discussion of this patchwork, see Ronald Winston Harmer, Insolvency Law and
Reform in the People's Republic of China, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (1996); Gordon C. Chang,
Bankruptcy Law in China: too much or too little? 13(5) CHINA L. & PRAC. 22 (June/July 1999);
GUANGHUA YU & MINKANG GU, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Chapter 15) in LAWS AFFECTING
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN THE PRC (2001); Li Shuguang, The Significance Brought by the
Drafting of the New Bankruptcy Law to China's Credit Culture and Credit Institutions, paper
presented at the Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform 2004: Insolvency Systems and Risk
Management in Asia, held in New Delhi, India, Nov. 3-5, 2004, sponsored by the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, and the OECD.
'8 See 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law.
19 See PRC Civil Procedure Law (1991).
20 See also 2002 PRC Supreme People's Court Provisions, art. 4.
21 PRC Company Law of 1993, Chapter VIII (adopted on Dec. 29, 1993 and revised on Dec. 25,
1999 and Aug. 28, 2004) [hereinafter the PRC Company Law].
22 i 1k ,j. 'Z [Liquidation Procedures of Foreign Investment Enterprises
adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation] (July 9, 1996) [hereinafter
the PRC Liquidation Procedures of FIEs].
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shareholders, the relevant departments and relevant
professional to form a liquidation committee which shall
conduct the bankruptcy liquidation of the company.
This provision is applicable after the declaration of bankruptcy has been
made. It applies in bankruptcies commenced by company liquidation
committees under Article 196 of the PRC Company Law and in
bankruptcies commenced by debtors or creditors under Article 199 of the
PRC Civil Procedure Law. Thus, Article 189 of the PRC Company Law
supplements the provisions of the PRC Civil Procedure Law in
bankruptcies involving PRC companies.
Also relevant in the legal framework is Article 71 of the PRC
Commercial Bank Law,2 3 which provides that if a commercial bank is
unable to pay its debts as they fall due, a People's Court shall, after
obtaining consent of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, declare
it bankrupt. A similar provision is included in the PRC Insurance Law for
insurance companies, which requires approval from the China Insurance
Regulatory Commission instead.24
With so many applicable laws, it might at first glance appear that
the law is comprehensive. In fact, the reality is just the opposite because
these laws are so short and incomplete - comprising merely the 43 articles
in 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law, the eight articles in Chapter XIX of the
PRC Civil Procedure Law, and a handful of other provisions (as noted
above). Moreover, as one commentator has noted, the changing nature of
the ownership interests of SOEs (e.g. through government distribution of
ownership interests and the selling small stakes of SOEs) has even made
it difficult at times to determine the proper scope of demarcation between
the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law and the PRC Civil Procedure Law.25
(2) Judicial interpretations. With so few provisions related to
insolvency in the existing legislation, it should not be surprising that there
are many inconsistencies as well as gaps and omissions. The PRC
Supreme People's Court has attempted to address these problems by
issuing judicial interpretations. The PRC Supreme People's Court issued
its Opinion on Questions Concerning the PRC Enterprise Insolvency Law
(Trial Implementation) on November 7, 1991 (the 1991 "PRC Supreme
People's Court Opinion"). 26 This opinion interprets the 1986 Chinese
23 t dk4 d[l, [PRC Commercial Bank Law] (Promulgated by the President of
the PRC on May 10, 1995, and effective as of July 1, 1995).
24 *A E, fnliY [PRC Insurance Law] (Promulgated by the President of the PRC on
June 30, 1995, and effective as of October 1, 1995).
25 Chang, supra note 17, at 22-23.
26 R -A), ( ) VffJi [Ref
No. 2500/91.0.07]. Printed in the Research Office of the Supreme People's Court (compilation),
4 J ~)~Jt~l f j} -% ( 431) [THE ASSEMBLAGE OF JUDICIAL
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Bankruptcy Law and with 76 articles is almost twice as long as the law
itself. In 1992, it promulgated the Application of the PRC Civil
Litigation Law Several Issues Opinion for non-SOE enterprise legal
persons (with 14 articles).27 Most recently, on July 30, 2002, the Supreme
People's Court promulgated its most comprehensive insolvency
interpretation to date with "106 Articles: Several Issues Concerning the
Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases" (the "2002 PRC Supreme People's
Court Provisions").28 This interpretation applies to both the 1986 Chinese
Bankruptcy Law and the PRC Civil Procedure Law and supercedes the
court's earlier interpretations where they are inconsistent. The 2002 PRC
Supreme People's Court Provisions "appear to be an attempt by the
Supreme People's Court to promulgate one set of regulations that will
govern both SOE and non-SOE bankruptcies" and "should go some way
towards obviating speculation as to whether certain provisions of the
[1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law] have been applicable in non-SOE
bankruptcies."29
(3) Important policy decrees issued by the government for certain
SOEs. These decrees may form the most important structure in China for
setting insolvency policy. The series of decrees are intended to facilitate
debt restructuring on a large scale through merger and acquisition and
bankruptcy under the Capital Structure Optimization Program
("CSOP").3 ° On October 25, 1994, the State Council issued the notice
entitled Proposal for Implementing State-Owned Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law in Some Cities (the "1994 PRC Notice"), 3' which addressed
problems involving the resettlement of workers of state-owned industrial
enterprises ("SIEs") made bankrupt in eighteen pilot cities, including
Shanghai. This notice provided special treatment for the resettlement of
workers - the land use rights obtained by a SIE were to be sold by auction
or tender with the first priority to the proceeds to be used for the
resettlement of the employees. The 1994 PRC Notice was followed by
the Notice on Certain Issues on Trial Implementation of Mergers and
Insolvency on State-Owned Enterprises, which was issued by the former
State Economy and Trade Commission ("SETC") and the People's Bank
of China on July 25, 1996.32 This increased the number of trial cities to
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT OF THE PRC] [hereinafter the 1991 PRC
Supreme People's Court Opinion].
27 ( jfj ij~jS . [APPLICATION OF
THE PRC CIVIL LITIGATION LAW SEVERAL ISSUES OPINION] (Nov. 7, 1991) available at
http://www.lawbook.com.cn/law/law view.asp?id=8106.
2 8 See 2002 PRC Supreme People's Court Provisions.
29 Chua Eu Jin, The Reform of the PRC Corporate Bankruptcy Law: Slowly but Surely, 16(8) CHINA
L. & PRAc. 19, 19 (Oct. 2002).
3 0 See WANG & Boom, supra note 9, at 8-16 (Wang).
31 -4u. _-iif k *abyi' U (1t) [Document No. 59]
[hereinafter the 1994 PRC Notice].
[Document No. 492], 1996.
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6. On March 2, 1997, the State Council issued a further Supplementary
Notice concerning the Problems Pertaining to the Trial Implementation of
State-Owned Enterprise Merger & Bankruptcy and Re-employment in
Certain Cities (the "1997 PRC Notice"), which increased the number of
trial cities to 111. 34 Section 2 of the 1997 PRC Notice provided for the
formulation of a Mergers and Bankruptcies of Enterprises Program to be
established under the coordination of the former SETC, whereby in
various trial cities, a list of enterprises would be drawn up for merger,
bankruptcy, and rescue. The largest creditors of the SOEs - the State-
owned banks - were to play an active role in the process and help identify
bad debts to be cancelled.
These policy documents currently apply to all the cities in
China. 3' They apply to SOEs whether or not the 1986 Chinese
Bankruptcy Law applies, and the "special treatment" for workers
resettlement rights would have priority over secured creditors and thus be
inconsistent with the procedures for distributing assets in the 1986 law. 36
These policy documents are crucial to understanding China's current
approach to bankruptcy and SOEs, and are an integral part of China's
"insolvency by policy" approach.37 They are certainly responsible for part
of the dramatic increase in the number of insolvency cases in China over
the last decade.38 However, it is interesting to note that with the increase
in the number of pilot cities from 18 to 56 in mid-1996 and then to 117 in
early 1997, although the number of SOE bankruptcies increased from
1,232 in 1995 to 3,651 in 1996, they then decreased to 3,060 in 1997 and
remained roughly at that level through 2000 (3,056 in 1998; 2,886 in
1999; and 3,296 in 200039). This leveling off, in fact, may be attributed in
part to the government policy of "controlled 'planned bankruptcy;"'
according to the statistics of the former SETC, from 1996 to 2000 less
than 30 per cent of SOE bankruptcies were bankrupted in accordance
with initiatives of the CSOP.4a
(4) Additional administrative out-of-court restructuring efforts.
Of the variety of government-led restructuring efforts, several others
33 Id.
JDocument No. 10], 1997 [hereinafter the 1997 PRC Notice].
Li, supra note 17, at 3.36 See Chang, supra note 17, at 23.
37 Li, supra note 17, at 3-4.
38 According to the Statistics of the PRC Supreme People's Court in March 2001, there were 1,625
cases in 1994; 2,583 in 1995; 5,875 in 1996; 5,396 in 1997; 5,673 in 1998; 5,622 in 1999; and 7,219
in 2000: WANG & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 12 (Wang). The Statistics of the Beijing Siyuan Merger
and Bankruptcy Consultancy, supra note 9, for that same period are 1,625 cases in 1994; 2,344 in
1995; 6,233 in 1996; 4,515 in 1997; 6,148 in 1998; 4,591 in 1999; and 7,528 in 2000. It also reports
that there were 8,939 cases in 2001. See supra note 9 for the statistics for 1989 to 1993.
39 According to the Statistics of the PRC Supreme People's Court in March 2001, cited in WANG &
BOOTH, supra note 9, at 12 (Wang).
40 WANG & BOOTH, supra note 9, at 12 (Wang).
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deserve mention. In September 1999 at the 4th Session of the 15 th Party
Congress, the Decision on Several Significant Issues on the Reform and
Development of State-Owned Enterprises was made, which included
measures for the banks to increase their bad-debt write-off of funds to
support the merger and bankruptcy of the large and medium-sized
SOEs. 4' Other measures included converting the debt of SOEs into
equity, thereby converting the major creditors of the SOEs (the state-
owned commercial banks) into shareholders.42 Also in 1999, four AMCs
were established to deal with the high level of non-performing loans
("NPLs") of the four main state-owned commercial banks,43 (estimated at
about US$125 billion") and others have been established since then.45 A
further effort to improve the situation of SOEs and the state-owned banks
was the restructuring procedure devised by the former SETC, which has
come to be known as the "Changchun Approach."
' 6
(5) Local rules and regulations. Many local governments,
including provinces and prefectures and some cities, have enacted their
own local regulations, procedures and rules to meet their local needs. An
example can be found in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (the
"Shenzhen SEZ Enterprise Bankruptcy Regulations," enacted by the
Standing Committee of the Shenzhen People's Congress on November
10, 1993).
These five structures in China combine to form a complicated
framework for bankruptcy: there are national efforts and local initiatives,
government central-planning policies and more market-oriented
initiatives, and different national bankruptcy laws for different types of
debtors.
"' Id. at 11 (Wang).42 
YU& GU, supra note 17, at 550-551.
43 China Xinda Asset Management Company (Cinda) for the Construction Bank of China (the first
to be established, in Apr. 1999), China Huarong Asset Management Corporation for the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China, Dongfang Asset Management Company (Oriental) for the Bank of
China, and the China Great Wall Asset Management Company for the Agricultural Bank of China
available at http://www.zii.co.ip/english/ae7393 asset manage china.html.
"Id.
41 See, e.g., the F- T f- Ak [Guangdong Guangye Asset Management Company] at
http://www.chinaonline.com/estore/financialAA030-75 PR.htm.
4" See WANG & BOOTH, supra note 9.
47 These regulations replaced the Shenzhen Bankruptcy Provisions on Foreign Related Companies
that were enacted in 1986 before the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law was promulgated. For a
discussion of Shenzhen practice, see Zhang & Booth, supra note 3. In Beijing there are provisions
applicable to the solvent liquidation of FIEs called the Liquidation Provisions of Foreign Investment
Enterprises, which were adopted by the Standing Committee of the Beijing People's Congress on
August 14, 1993. For a discussion of the Beijing practice, see Xianchu Zhang & Charles D. Booth,
Beijing's Initiative on Cross-Border Insolvency: Reflections on a Recent Visit of Hong Kong
Professionals to Beijing, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 29 (2002). [hereinafter Zhang & Booth,
Beijing's Initiative on Cross-Border Insolvency].
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Vietnam
The pre-2004 insolvency law reform landscape in Vietnam
involved the following:
(1) National bankruptcy law and other legal provisions and
procedures. The 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, with 51 sections,
was the only national bankruptcy law and applied to both SOEs and non-
SOE enterprises. It was broader than the Chinese law in that it also
applied to enterprises without legal person status.
Vietnam, like China, has other legislation pertaining to the solvent
liquidation of enterprises outside the scope of the bankruptcy law, notably
the Vietnamese Foreign Investment Law48 ("Vietnamese FIL") and the
Vietnamese Enterprise Law 2000. 4 9 There are legislative provisions in
these laws that direct insolvent liquidations to follow the 1993 bankruptcy
laws. Article 53 of the Vietnamese FIL provides that if in the course of
the liquidation of an FIE it is discovered that the FIE is on the verge of
bankruptcy, the FIE's bankruptcy should be carried out in accordance
with the provisions of the laws concerning enterprise bankruptcy.5° In
contrast to Article 27 of the PRC Liquidation Procedures of FIEs, Article
53 of the Vietnamese law does not provide how the bankruptcy should be
commenced. In addition, unlike the Chinese national FIE law, the
Vietnamese provision applies in some cases involving the value of land
use rights after a bankruptcy case has been commenced. 5' Lastly, the
1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law overlapped with other legislation
regarding the treatment of land use rights and this was the source of many
conflicts.52
48 Vietnamese Foreign Investment Law (1996) arts. 52, 53. This replaced an earlier foreign
investment law dating from 1987. This law was amended on June 9, 2000, under Law No.
18/2000/QHI0 available at http://www.dni.hochiminhcitv., ov.vn/invest/htinl/law2.htnl
[hereinafter the Vietnamese FILl. The reorganization (division, demerger, merger, or
consolidation) of an FIE pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of Vietnamese Decree No. 24 providing
detailed regulations on the implementation of the law on foreign investment in Vietnam would also
be outside the scope of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. See Joelle Daumas, Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam, in THE ASIA-PACIFIC RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY GUIDE 2003/04 at
173-77 (2003).
49 Daumas, supra note 48. The same is true of a reorganization of a solvent enterprise under the
Vietnamese Enterprise Law 2000.50 See JOHNSON, STOKES & MASTER, VIETNAM, A GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS 22 (2002).
5' Article 53.4 of the Vietnamese FIL, supra note 48, provides that where the Vietnamese Party
participating in a joint venture enterprise who has contributed capital in the form of the value of
land use rights is dissolved or bankrupt, the remaining value of the land use rights contributed as
capital shall be included in the enterprise's assets that are subject to the liquidation.
52 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Two, II, 5 ("Problems
on dealing with the land use rights of enterprise declared bankrupt"). One such conflict involved a
contest between the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law and Article 26 of the Vietnamese Land Law
(enacted on July 14, 1993 and came into operation on October 15, 1993), which also applied to
bankruptcies. Id. at Part Two, I1, 5.1(2) ("Land recollected by the state"). Available at
http://coombs.antedu.au/,-vemluat/english/Law-land-law.txt, as amended in Nov. 1998 and June
2001. See also JOHNSON, STOKES & MASTER, supra note 50, at 24.
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(2) Judicial interpretations and regulations. These included the
following: Decision No. 528/QDBT, dated June 13, 1995, of the
Vietnamese Minister of Justice, issuing Operation Regulation of the
Trustee Committee and the Property Realization Committee; Decision
No. 426/QD of the Vietnamese People's Supreme Court, dated July 1,
1994, issuing Operation Regulation of the Collective of Judges
Responsible for Handling Applications for Bankruptcy; and Official
Letter No. 457/HKXX, dated July 21, 1994, of the Vietnamese People's
Supreme Court, on the application of some provisions of the 1993
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law.53
(3) Government decrees and regulations. Decree No.189/CP of
the Vietnamese government, dated December 23, 1994, guided the
implementation of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law ("Vietnamese
Decree No. 189"). 54 Article I provided greater detail concerning the
scope of the enterprises subject to the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law,
as including "state-owned enterprises, enterprises of socio-political
organizations, private enterprises, limited liability companies, stock
companies, wholly or partly foreign owned enterprises ("FIEs"), and
cooperative groups. 55 However, Article 2 provided that the bankruptcy
of an FIE must comply with both the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law
and the Vietnamese FIL, thereby causing some difficulties. 56 The
promulgation of other decrees led to some overlap with the 1993
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. For example, Decree No. 92/CP of the
government, dated December 19, 1995, pertained to the settlement of
employees' interests in bankrupt enterprises and included some
provisions that set out a special priority for workers who were injured in a
labor accident or suffered from a disease in their course of work, which
was inconsistent in some respects with the 1993 bankruptcy law.57
(4) Administrative out-of-court restructuring efforts. In 1998,
Vietnam established the National Enterprise Reform Committee (the
"NERC") to reactivate an equitization process for SOEs. 58 Decree
44/1998/ND-CP, dated June 29, 1998, regulates the equitization of
SOEs.59 The NERC has equitized more than 700 SOEs since 1999. It has
" VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part One, III ("Actual
status of enterprise bankruptcy law in Vietnam").
VIETNAMESE DECREE No. 189 (1994), available at http://www.vietnamese-law-
consultancy.com/sources/s bankeruptcy/bankeruptey 12 94.htm.
5 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Two, I, 2.5 ("The
Enterprises whose bankruptcy has been declared were mainly belonging to non-state sectors").
56 JOHNSON, STOKES & MASTER, supra note 50, at 23.57 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Two, II, 4 ("With
respect to protection of the interests of employees of the bankrupt enterprises").
5 AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC ANALYTICAL UNIT, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE,
CHANGING CORPORATE ASIA: WHAT BUSINESS NEEDS TO KNOW 171 (March 2002), available at
htt://www.monash.edu.aulcasestudies/css/416 ca.htn [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC
ANALYTICAL UNIT, CHANGING CORPORATE ASIA].
59 JOHNSON, STOKES & MASTER, supra note 50, at 28.
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also pushed for the liquidation of non-viable SOEs.6° Other government
initiatives have helped finance severance payments for workers who have
been made redundant, have devolved control of the equitization of
provincial SOEs to provincial governments, have restructured large
SOEs, and have privatized small SOEs. 6' Vietnam has taken steps to
improve the banking system and, like China, has established AMCs
connected to the commercial banks to dispose of NPLs.62 Vietnam has
also established a national Debts and Assets Trading Company managed
by the Ministry of Finance.63
(5) Local provisions. There are also some local laws with
provisions regarding bankruptcy, such as the 1972 Commercial Code of
Saigon, which pre-dated the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law.
There was a concern in Vietnam that some of the provisions in the
1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law and the guiding implementation
documents lacked uniformity, conflicted with other related documents,
and therefore caused some problems for the competent bodies in the
settlement of bankruptcy applications. 64 The bankruptcy drafting
committee was also aware that the low rate of bankruptcy did not reflect
the reality - that given the number of enterprises in Vietnam and the
regulatory effect of the bankruptcy law, it was clear that, in effect, the
official bankruptcy rates were "fictitious." 65
It can be seen that the framework for insolvency in Vietnam
shares many similarities with the Chinese framework. However, one key
difference is that from the outset the Vietnamese promulgated one
national bankruptcy law that applied to SOEs, legal person enterprises,
and non-legal person enterprises. This broader jurisdiction, however, did
not lead to an increase in cases. Although the formal law was simpler, it
was almost never utilized.
Ill. SCOPE OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
Throughout the insolvency reform process, Vietnam debated, and
China is still debating, what the proper scope of the new laws should be.
Among the issues that have been debated are the following: Should the
new laws apply to all SOEs? Should the new laws apply to banks,
60 AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC ANALYTICAL UNIT, CHANGING CORPORATE ASIA, supra note 58, at
171.
61 Id.
62 See Hoang Tien Loi, Trends and Developments in Insolvency Systems and Risk Management -
The Experience of Vietnam," paper presented at the Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform 2004:
Insolvency Systems and Risk Management in Asia, held in New Delhi, India, Nov. 3-5, 2004,
sFonsored by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the OECD.
6 Id.
64 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Introduction.
65 Id. at Part Two, I, 2.1. See also AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC ANALYTICAL UNIT, CHANGING
CORPORATE ASIA, supra note 58, at 183 (citing YOUTH, Nov. 2, 2001, which reported that 300
companies in 2001 alone "disappeared" without going through the bankruptcy process).
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insurance companies, and securities companies? Should the new laws
apply to non-legal persons, including partnerships and sole
proprietorships? Moreover, should the new laws extend beyond business-
related enterprises and apply to consumers?
A. Should the law apply to SOEs?
SOEs often provide important public goods and services. In
addition, they provide a broad array of guaranteed benefits to their
workers including housing, education, and health care. This can prove to
be an especially expensive proposition if the SOE has far too many
workers. Thus, when an SOE files for liquidation or reorganization, in
addition to addressing the business issues, it will also have to satisfy the
guaranteed minimum social benefits, which will likely involve the
"resettlement" and retraining of many of its workers.
China
The Chinese have been grappling with the issues involving the
insolvency of SOEs since the beginning of the bankruptcy law drafting
process. The reform process was started, in great part, to improve the dire
straits of SOEs. There is no doubt that many, if not the majority, of state-
controlled enterprises in China would benefit from the enactment of a
comprehensive insolvency regime. However, a dramatic increase in the
number of SOEs filing for bankruptcy would likely lead to two other sets
of problems: (1) high unemployment that could result in social unrest, and
(2) a knock-on effect leading to the bankruptcy of many state-owned
banks.66 Because of these problems, and concurrently with the drafting
process, China took other major steps to address the problems of the
SOEs and the related problems of the high level of the NPLs owed by
SOEs to the state-owned banks. Included in the steps are those discussed
above in Part I: instituting the CSOP and promulgating the 1994 and 1997
PRC Notices, establishing AMCs, and experimenting with the Changchun
Approach.
Given the magnitude of the problems with the SOEs and the high
level of government control over the SOE reform process, it is not
surprising that the Chinese have hotly debated whether to subject SOEs to
the new bankruptcy regime. One of the main reasons for commencing the
bankruptcy reform process was to correct the inadequacies of the 1986
Chinese Bankruptcy Law in dealing with SOEs. Nevertheless, by 2000, it
was clear that a split was emerging within the bankruptcy law drafting
committee. At a conference organized by the Asian Institute of
International Financial Law at the University of Hong Kong in November
66 See Zhang & Booth, supra note 3, at 3.
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2000, there was a heated discussion among drafting committee members
as to whether the new law should apply to all SOEs or whether there
should be a carve-out for some of the older SOEs.67 This latter view was
incorporated into the 2001 and 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Laws.
Article 3 of the 2002 draft law provided that the State Council was
authorized to stipulate regulations concerning the special issues of
bankruptcies conducted by SOEs that were established before 1994, when
the PRC Company Law took effect.68 It thus appeared from the 2002 draft
that only SOEs established after that date would be subject to the new law
and that the older, larger, and more inefficient SOEs would be exempt
from its application.
69
This exemption for the older SOEs does not appear in the October
2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law, but the effect appears to be the
same. Article 148 of the October 2004 Draft provides that before the new
bankruptcy is enacted, the special matter of the insolvency of SOEs
within a certain scope and within certain deadlines previously set by the
State Council shall be addressed by regulations prescribed by the State
Council. Further details have emerged: the current proposal is to allow
certain SOEs to go bankrupt under relevant regulations issued by the
State Council within the next two to three years. After that, the new law
will handle all SOE bankruptcies. 70 This exemption will apply to the
largest of the SOEs. The State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission ("SASAC") of the State Council estimates
that roughly 2,000 SOEs may take advantage of this "administrative
closure., 71 The irony of the situation is that over a decade has passed
since the Chinese began reforming their bankruptcy law, and although the
new Chinese bankruptcy law was intended to deal with serious SOE
problems, by the time the new law comes into operation the majority of
SOEs in need of assistance will already have been dealt with through
bankruptcy, reorganization, merger, or other mechanisms discussed
above. Early ambitions have given way to a pragmatic administrative
67 Symposium, Chinese Insolvency Law: The Need to Develop An Effective Insolvency
Infrastructure, organized by the Asian Institute of International Financial Law at the University of
Hong Kong (Nov. 17-18, 2000). See also Booth, supra note 12, at 15.
68 Earlier language to this effect appeared in Article 168 of the 2001 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law.
69 Although it remained unclear whether the older SOEs would be subject to new regulations or
remain subject to the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law. Article 162 of the 2002 Draft Chinese
Bankruptcy Law provided for the abolition of the 1986 law upon the enactment of the new law, but
at a workshop in which I participated that was organized by the Finance and Economic Committee
of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China and held in Beijing, China, in
Apr. 2002, members of the bankruptcy law drafting committee noted that perhaps the old law would
continue to apply to these old SOEs until new regulations were drafted.
70 Lan Xinhen, Outdated Bankruptcy Law Upgraded (2004) available at
http://www.bireview.com.cn/200430/Business-200430(B).htm. But see PricewaterhouseCoopers,
China's new bankruptcy law: The start of something big? (2004) available at
http://www.pwchk.com/home/printen./cn bankruptcy law oct2004.html, which notes that this
?eriod of exemption may extend for three to five years.
I See Lan Xinhen supra note 70, at 1.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW
solution. However, after the period for administrative closure has
expired, one of the main advantages of the new law over current practice
will be the unification of the law and treating the bankruptcy of SOEs and
non-SOE legal persons under the same legal framework.
The new law will also include a significant policy change from
current law. Under the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law, an SOE may not
file for bankruptcy without first getting permission to proceed from the
government authority in charge.72 This requirement for first obtaining the
permission of the government authority has been removed from the draft
bankruptcy laws.73 Deletion of this requirement will arguably weaken the
power that local government authorities exercise over SOEs subject to
their control. Similar changes will also apply in cases against SOEs
commenced by creditors' petitions. At present, under Article 3 of the
1986 PRC Chinese Bankruptcy Law, the People's Court will not enter a
bankruptcy declaration against "public enterprises and enterprises which
have an important relationship to the national economy and to the
people's livelihood" (a public interest exception) unless the relevant
government authority in charge has not provided financial assistance or
adopted other measures to assist the enterprise in repaying its debts. In
other words, if a creditor petitions for bankruptcy against such an SOE
and the relevant government authority decides to provide financial
assistance, the bankruptcy declaration can be avoided. If the government
authority decides not to provide financial assistance, the declaration may
be made. Furthermore, in a case commenced by a creditor's petition
against an SOE, the government authority may delay the making of a
bankruptcy declaration by filing a reorganization plan. 74 The October
2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law no longer includes these exceptions,
which will further erode the control of the local government authorities.
Vietnam
Although Vietnam, like China, adopted a multi-pronged approach
to deal with the problems caused by the financial weaknesses of SOEs,
the issue of whether the new bankruptcy law should apply to SOEs does
72 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 8; 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions art. 5. The law
appears to require only government approval for a debtor's petition, but the reality is that the
approval of the relevant state authorities is always required. See also Zhang & Booth, supra note 3,
in notes 25-27 and accompanying text. In fact, the local authorities are reluctant to grant their
approval, because they are responsible for resettling the employees after the bankruptcy of the SOE.
See also Lan, supra note 70, at 1.
73 See, e.g., the 2002 and June and October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Laws.
74See Chang, supra note 17. See art. 17 of the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law and art. 28 of the
2002 PRC Supreme People's Court Provisions: Article 17 of the 1986 law provides that the
application for reorganization must be filed by the government authority within three months of the
date the People's Court accepts the bankruptcy case and that the reorganization must be completed
within two years. Article 28 of the 2002 provisions further provides that the application must be
filed before the People's Court enters the bankruptcy declaration.
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not appear to have been a controversial one in Vietnam. Under the 1993
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, very few SOEs actually resorted to the
procedure - at the end of 1999, only ten SOEs and two state-owned
cooperative groups had been declared bankrupt.75 Reasons for this low
rate included the following factors:
(1) SOEs are entitled to various forms of preferential
treatment and state provided assistance in running their
business;
(2) The courts would only consider issuing bankruptcy
applications against SOEs after the relevant state authority
had issued a decision not to adopt measures necessary to
assist the repayment of debts;
(3) Some state authorities and agencies were not sufficiently
aware of the importance of the 1993 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law;
(4) State authorities often failed to decide (or when they
decided, failed to do so clearly and definitely) whether to
apply for a declaration of insolvency or to seek dissolution
of the enterprise, with the result that SOEs were often
allowed by the superior agencies to be dissolved instead
of being declared bankrupt under the 1993 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law.76
It is clear that in Vietnam, as in China, the relevant government
authorities played an integral role in determining whether an SOE should
file for bankruptcy. However, the articles regarding the petition make no
mention of the need to secure the approval of the relevant government
authority.
77
One of the primary goals of the Vietnamese reform process was to
enact a new law that would be utilized by more SOEs. The extent to
which this goal is achieved will be dependent in great part on whether
SOEs are confident that the new law offers enough substantive
improvements over the old law and whether the necessary supporting
infrastructure is in place to ensure the efficient operation of the new law.
Both the 2002 draft and the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law
retain the unified approach in which the same rules apply to SOE and
non-SOE enterprises. Both the draft law and the current law also retain a
limited exemption from Section 1 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy
7 5 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Two, 1, 2.5.
76 Id.
77 1993 Vietnmese Bankruptcy Law arts. 7 (creditor's petition), 8 (worker's petition), 9 (debtor's
petition). Compare with 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 8 (requiring approval in the case of a
debtor's petition).
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Law for some SOEs engaged in providing public services, national
defense, and/or security.78 Revised Article 2.2 provides that:
The Government shall make detailed provisions on the list of
enterprises and the application of this Law to special
enterprises that directly serve the national defense and
security, enterprises and cooperatives that operate in the fields
of finance, and banking and insurance and other fields that
provide essential products and public service on a regular and
direct basis.79
The new 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law thus applies to all SOEs, with
the exception that Article 2.2 provides that the government shall
promulgate "detailed provisions" on the application of the new
bankruptcy law to the narrow category of "special enterprises." As is
discussed below, the category of exempt enterprises in China is narrower
and only applies to enterprises operating in the areas of banking, finance,
and insurance.
B. Should the law apply to banks, insurance companies, and
securities companies?
There is no international consensus about whether the bankruptcy
of banks, insurance companies, securities companies, and other financial
institutions should be handled under bankruptcy laws or under separate
laws. For example, the United States generally excludes these entities
from the U. S. Bankruptcy Code. 80 On the other hand, Hong Kong relies
on an old English company law approach in which the company law
includes both insolvency-related commencement criteria as well as non-
insolvency regulatory grounds for winding-up companies in regulated
industries such as banking and insurance.
81
78 Under the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, a bankruptcy case against SOEs operating in these
areas could not proceed unless the Court received a letter of authorization from the Prime Minister
or the head of the government agency that established the business. JOHNSON, STOKES & MASTER,
supra note 50, at 22.
79 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 2(2).
80 More particularly, in the United States, banks and insurance companies are excluded from both
the liquidation and reorganization provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2),
(b)(3), & (d) (2005)) and stockbrokers and commodity brokers are excluded from the reorganization
jlrovisions (Id. § 109(d)).
For example, petitions based on these non-insolvency related grounds, called "public interest"
petitions, are handled under the usual insolvency provisions in the H. K. Companies Ordinance
(cap. 32) as supplemented or amended by relevant provisions in the legislation that directly applies
to the regulated industry. See Charles D. Booth, When Government Intervenes: Winding Up
Fraudulent Companies in Hong Kong, 29 HONG KONG L.J. 368 (1999).
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China
Article 71 of the PRC Commercial Bank Law provides that a
commercial bank not paying its debts may, with the consent of the China
Banking Regulatory Commission, be declared bankrupt by a People's
Court. A similar provision is included in Article 86 of the PRC Insurance
Law, subject to the approval of the China Insurance Regulatory
Commission. Both of these provisions provide for the appointment of a
liquidation team and the banking provision. Section 71 also includes a
paragraph setting out that the "payment of the principal of savings
deposits of individuals and interest thereon shall be given a priority after
the liquidation expenses, the wages owed to the employees and labor
insurance premiums have been paid." That is the full extent of the
discussion of bankruptcy in these two laws. It is noteworthy, and
unfortunate, that neither of these provisions refers to the 1986 Bankruptcy
Law, the PRC Civil Procedure Law, nor the PRC Company Law. 82
The 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law explicitly excluded
commercial banks from the scope of coverage. 83 There was a view among
some that the new bankruptcy law should apply to commercial banks and
insurance companies, but that securities companies and trust companies
would not be mentioned explicitly for fear that they would seek special
treatment. 84 This view, however, did not carry the day and the exclusion
was carried over into the June and October 2004 drafts. Article 149 of
the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law provides that the
insolvency of banks, insurance companies, and other financial
organizations shall be governed by implementation regulations based on
the new bankruptcy law and related laws to be issued by the State
Council. The matter has not been finalized, however. This is one issue
still being debated by the drafting committee and the ultimate treatment
still remains uncertain.
Vietnam
The 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law did not extend to banking,
financial, or insurance entities. The 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy
Law expressly took financial, monetary, and insurance business outside
the scope of the new law through the interaction of Sections 1.2 and 6.5.
This exclusion was carried over into Article 2.2 of the 2004 Vietnamese
82 See Harmer, supra note 17, at 2573 (discussing the bank provision).
83 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 160.
The securities firms in China are arguably in a more precarious situation than the Chinese banks.
See REPORT ON THE 2004 SYMPOSIUM ON BUILDING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE 2 1sT
CENTURY: AN AGENDA FOR CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, held in Beijing, China (June 11-13,
2004), at 21.
85 See VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part One, 1II, 3.5.
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Bankruptcy Law in the same form as the treatment for excluded SOEs.
The government is to make "detailed provisions" on the application of the
new bankruptcy law to "enterprises and cooperatives which operate in the
fields of finance, banking and insurance." This is similar to the approach
adopted by China for these institutions, except that the Vietnamese
provision refers solely to the bankruptcy law and not to bankruptcy and
"related laws."
C. Should the law apply only to legal persons or should it
also apply to partnerships and sole proprietors?
As noted above, the PRC Civil Procedure Law applies only to
non-SOE legal person enterprises, and Article 206 explicitly excludes
individual businesses (e.g., sole proprietorships) and partnerships formed
by private individuals. The 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law rejected
this approach. Article 3 expressly included partnership enterprises and
their partners, individual proprietorship enterprises, and other profit-
making organizations that are established in accordance with the law.
The enactment of this article would have dramatically expanded the scope
of the new bankruptcy law to that of a far-ranging business bankruptcy
law. However, the October 2004 draft returned to the position in the
current PRC Civil Procedure Law. Article 2 of the October 2004 draft
expressly applies to debtors that are legal person enterprises and the
revised Article 147 provides that the bankruptcy of partnerships and sole
proprietorships shall be dealt with under other related laws. The Chinese
bankruptcy reform process on this issue has thus come full circle.
However, the issue has not yet been conclusively resolved, as it is
understood that there is still some support for including partnerships and
sole proprietors in the new law.
Vietnam
The situation in Vietnam was quite different. Unlike the Chinese
law, the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law applied to a broad range of
both legal person and non-legal person enterprises. Section 1 of this law
applied this law "to all forms of business ownership" and Vietnamese
Decree 189 provided further details as to the scope of application as
including private enterprises. 86 Partnerships were also covered. 87 An
86 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
87 Partnerships were included pursuant to the general language in Article I of the 1993 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law. VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part One,
III, 1.1 ("Limits on the subjects to apply bankruptcy procedures"). In Vietnam, a partnership is
defined as an enterprise, which must have at least two partners (who are personally liable for the
firm's obligations), in addition to equity contribution members (whose liability is limited by the
level of their capital contributions). JOHNSON, STOKES & MASTER, supra note 50, at 27. ("Unlike
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impetus in the early drafting was to expand further the scope of the law to
include some non-private enterprises such as household businesses. It
was noted that although both private businesses and household businesses
had unlimited liability and although neither was a legal person, under the
old law private enterprises were allowed to file for bankruptcy to release
their obligations, but household businesses were not permitted to do so.
88
The drafting of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law was
influenced by these arguments in favor of expanding the scope of
application, as well as by arguments that the defined category for the new
law should be a "merchant," which under Article 35.1 of the Vietnamese
Commercial Law extended to organizations, individuals, legal persons,
households, or cooperatives. 89 Thus, Section 1.1 of the 2002 Draft
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law stated that the new law would be applicable
to merchants who had fallen into a bankrupt situation. Section 6.4, in
turn, defined merchant quite expansively as including the following:
Individuals, collective groups, households, collectives, limited
liability companies, holding companies, partnerships, private
enterprises, enterprises with partly foreign invested capital,
enterprises with 100% foreign invested capital, enterprises
belonging to political or social organizations, state enterprises,
and those that have a business registration certificate and
operate independently and continuously.
The 2002 Vietnamese draft, however, did carve out an exception for
small-scale sole proprietorships, namely hawkers and nosh vendors with
low business capital, turnover, and income. 90
Interestingly, the Vietnamese, like the Chinese, retreated from
their expansive draft and returned to notions in their existing law. Thus,
Article 2 provides that the new law applies to all enterprises, cooperatives
and cooperative unions. The expansive definition in Section 6.4 of the
2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law was deleted and no new
definition inserted. Instead, a series of provisions from Article 15
through Article 18 provide for who may file the petitions on behalf of the
debtors that are able to use the new law - enterprises and cooperatives
(Article 15), SOEs (Article 16), joint stock companies (Article 17), and
partnerships (Article 18). Sole proprietor private enterprises are included
(Article 15), but household businesses are not. Although partnerships and
sole proprietorship private enterprises are included in the scope of the
limited liability and shareholding companies the concept of partnerships is new in Vietnam and their
status, therefore, is less clear.")
88 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Three, II, 1 ("On
a Plicable scale of the Bankruptcy Law").
o Id.
92002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law § 1.3.
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new law, there are no provisions that address the possibility of a
discharge or an entitlement to retain exempt property.
Summary
It is unfortunate that Vietnam, like China, retreated from its more
expansive jurisdiction, although the position to which the Vietnamese law
has returned is broader than the existing (and proposed) Chinese position.
Business entities that are not covered by the new laws still need to raise
capital and have creditors. By excluding these debtors from the new law,
the government policy discriminates against these other forms of
business.91
D. Should the law apply to consumers?
When China enacted its bankruptcy law in 1986 and Vietnam in
1993, the debate in each country focused on which business enterprises
should be permitted to utilize the new procedure. It was too early to raise
even the possibility of consumer bankruptcy legislation and consumers
were left outside the scope of the new laws. In contrast, in the United
States consumer petitions comprise the great majority of bankruptcy
petitions 92 (more than 1,000,000 individuals file for bankruptcy every
year).93 The number of people who file for bankruptcy annually is greater
than the number of people who have a heart attack, are diagnosed with
cancer, graduate from college, or file for divorce. 94 Thus, it may be
difficult for Americans to envision a country where consumers are not
permitted to file for bankruptcy. However, given that even early English
and U.S. bankruptcy laws were applicable only to merchants or to others
engaged in commerce, 95 it should not be surprising that China and
Vietnam, which have only enacted bankruptcy laws over the last two
decades, have excluded consumers from the application of the law.
At the time that bankruptcy laws were being introduced in China
and Vietnam, each country was in only the initial stage of making the
transition from a planned economy to a market-based economy; therefore,
there were few opportunities for consumer finance. However, a strong
argument can be made that the China and the Vietnam of today, with their
91 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Three, II, 1.
92 Between 97%-98% for each year from 2000 to 2004. News Release of the Administrative Office
Of the U.S. Courts (Dec. 3, 2004) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press Releases/fy04bk.pdf.
From 2000 to 2004, the number of non-business filings ranged from a low of 1,226,037 (2000) to
a high of 1,625,813 (2003). Id.
94 ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE
CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE 6 (2003).
95 See, eg-, 13 Eliz. ch. 7 (1571) in England and the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in the United States.
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY 27-31 (2nd ed., 1990).
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emerging middle classes and increased consumer financing and
spending, 96 should now expand the coverage of the laws beyond their
business-oriented origins. Although during the drafting process there was
some limited support in both China and Vietnam for enacting a
comprehensive bankruptcy law that also applied to consumers, this was
clearly the minority view, and neither the new Vietnamese bankruptcy
law nor the October 2004 Chinese draft has moved in this direction. Of
course, as the purchasing power of consumers increases and a larger
percentage of such purchases are made on credit, it is only a matter of
time before both countries will have to reconsider this issue.
97
The Chinese and the Vietnamese have been approaching the issue
of sole proprietorship and partnership bankruptcies from the perspective
of business bankruptcies. However, including these categories in the
bankruptcy law also has benefits from a consumer bankruptcy
perspective. Applying a bankruptcy law to individual business owners
and partnerships enables courts to gain experience grappling with the
types of issues that arise with individual bankruptcies, such as the
automatic discharge and exempt property, and provides the courts with a
head start for the day when consumer bankruptcy laws will have to be
enacted.
IV. BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION
There are a variety of ways to structure the administration of
bankruptcy cases and many questions to be debated by law reformers:
Should an outside trustee be appointed? What role are creditors allowed
to play? How active should the court and the government be in the
process? Are there proper checks and balances? The Chinese and
Vietnamese have addressed these issues and both the October 2004 Draft
Chinese Bankruptcy Law and the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law
improve upon the organizational structures for the administration of
bankruptcies contained in the 2002 drafts and in the older laws.
China
A major innovation that has emerged from the drafting process in
China is the introduction of a new functionary in the bankruptcy
96 For example, during the SARS scare in Beijing in 2005, car sales boomed; in April 2003, 50% of
the sales were on installment. See Auto Market to Maintain Fast Growth, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
May 30, 2003 available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/May/65827.htm.
97 For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between consumer credit and personal
bankruptcy law reform in China, see Xian-Chu Zhang, Development of Consumer Credit in China
and Concerns about the Underlying Legal Infrastructure (Chapter 5) in JOHANNA NIEMI-
KIESILAINEN, lAIN RAMSAY & WILLIAM C. WHITFORD (eds.), CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2003).
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procedure called an "administrator" to take control of the debtor's assets
and exercise a broad range of administrative responsibilities. This
innovation appears as a new Chapter III in the October 2004 Draft
Chinese Bankruptcy Law98 (it was a chapter section in the 2002 draft).99
The post of administrator does not exist under the current bankruptcy
regime. In bankruptcies under current Chinese law, a trustee or
administrator is not appointed. Rather, the court establishes a liquidation
committee. Article 47 of the 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions
provides that in cases under the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law, within 15
days of declaring the enterprise bankrupt, the court shall establish a
liquidation committee. Article 48 provides that the committee may
consist of members chosen from the superior department in charge of the
SOE (if the case involves an SOE); liquidation-related intermediary
organizations; relevant government departments (including financial
departments, administrations for industry and commerce, planning
commissions, etc.); and professionals, including lawyers and
accountants. 10o In practice, professionals are rarely appointed to the
committee, and, in the bankruptcy of non-SOEs, the liquidation
committee usually plays a minor role.'01
A further problem under current law flows from the fact that the
liquidation committee is not appointed when the court accepts the case,
but rather within 15 days of the date that the court makes the adjudication
order. Thus, during the gap period, which can be lengthy, there is no one
in charge to prevent existing management from misappropriating the
debtor's assets. 10
2
The introduction of the office of the administrator should address
many of the infirmities in the current law. First, the administrator (or
administrators, as it appears that in effect a team of administrators may be
appointed) shall be appointed from the day the case is accepted. 103
Second, an administrator will be a professional - either an individual or a
relevant social intermediary - with the necessary expertise and
background to perform the responsibilities. An individual may be a
98 See 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 19-27.
99 See 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 27-32.
'oo See also 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 23 (for SOEs); PRC Civil Procedure Law art. 201
(for non-SOEs); PRC Company Law art. 189 (for companies). The relevant government
departments often designate members of the committee. See Li, supra note 17, at 13.10' Li, supra note 17, at 13.
102 Wang Weiguo, Administrator in New Bankruptcy Law of China, paper presented at the Forum on
Asian Insolvency Reform 2004: Insolvency Systems and Risk Management in Asia, held in New
Delhi, India, Nov. 3-5, 2004, sponsored by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the
OECD. Article 18 of the 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions addresses in part this "gap
period" problem by providing the court upon accepting a bankruptcy case with the power to appoint
"an enterprise management committee."
103 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 19; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
16. The day the case is accepted is also when the automatic stay on unsecured creditors comes into
operation. October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 30; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy
Law art. 19.
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lawyer or certified public accountant, and relevant social intermediaries' 04
may be drawn from law firms, accounting firms, and bankruptcy and
liquidation firms. 105 Administrators should have professional expertise
and qualifications, and individuals should carry liability insurance. 10 6 The
Supreme People's Court shall establish further details regarding the
qualifications of, and appointment methods for, the administrator. 107
Eventually, there will be a special license required of insolvency
administrators and a unified examination will be established. 0 8
Article 22 of the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law,
(Article 27 in the 2002 draft) sets out criteria that disqualify an individual
or institution from appointment, including -a prior criminal record,
revocation of a professional license, being an interested party in the case,
or being thought of by the People's Court to be otherwise inappropriate
for appointment. Other provisions provide for situations in which the
administrator is negligent, incompetent, or commits unlawful or wrongful
acts. The institution of the administrator will play a major role in the new
bankruptcy procedure.' 0 9 The administrator will be able to hire staff.110
Unlike the current liquidation team, the administrator (or administration
team) will be a disinterested and neutral party.
Article 29 of the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law
authorizes the administrator to take over all of the debtor's property from
the date of appointment by the People's Court."' Article 23 sets out a
broad list of administrative functions that the administrator shall perform
after his designation:"
12
(1) taking over all of the debtor's property, accounting
books, documents, data, seals, and other articles;
(2) investigating into the debtor's property, status, and civil
activities, including salaries owed to laborers, owed costs
for social security and tax owed by the debtor;
(3) making a report on the investigation into the financial
status;
(4) determining the internal management affairs of the
debtor;
'04 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 21; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
27.
105 See Li, supra note 17, at 13.
106 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 22.107 Id.; compare with 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 27 (specifying that the State Council
would be responsible for this).108 Wang, supra note 102, at 3.
109 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 27; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts.
26, 27.11o October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 26.
1112002 Draft Chinese Insolvency Law art. 25.
112 It deletes one function from Article 29 of the 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law and changes
the order of priority.
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(5) employing necessary managing personnel, professional
technicians and other staff;
(6) determining whether or not the debtor shall continue to
operate the business before the convention of the first
creditors' meeting;
(7) managing and handling the debtor's property;
(8) accepting the property delivery by a third party to the
debtor;
(9) participating in a lawsuit or an arbitration concerning the
disputes over the debtor's property and distribution of the
bankrupt property;
(10) calling for the convening of the creditors' meeting; and
(11) other rights that the court thinks shall be exercised by the
administrator.
In addition to these functions set out in Chapter III, there are
many other functions to be exercised by the administrator that are set out
in other chapters of the draft law. These range from seeking application
of the avoidance powers to raising objections to creditors' claims to
playing an integral role in the reorganization.1 13 If a reorganization is
attempted, the administrator is intended to play the leading role, unless
the debtor chooses to retain control of the business - under a modified
debtor-in-possession approach - in which case the administrator will
supervise the debtor. 1
4
The most contentious issue regarding the administrator is who
should have the power of appointment. Article 16 of the 2002 draft
provided that the People's Court would designate an administrator when
accepting an application for bankruptcy, but Article 56(2) of the 2002
draft provided that when the case was underway, the creditors' meeting
had the power to select, appoint, and replace the administrator. This
procedure has been modified in the October 2004 draft. Article 19 of the
October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law now provides that the
administrator shall be appointed by the court. Where the creditors'
meeting thinks that the administrator cannot perform his duty fairly or is
not competent, it may apply to the court to dismiss the administrator and
appoint another one.' 5 Some groups are unhappy at this demotion of the
role of the creditors in the current draft. Some members of the drafting
committee argued in favor of the doctrine in which the administrator
would be a "representative of the creditors," but ultimately the majority of
the committee opted for the administrator serving as a "legal organ"
113 For a comprehensive list of these functions, see Wang, supra note 102, at 3.
It4 See discussion infra Part IV.
115 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 19.
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independent of the creditors." 16 The power of appointment is one of the
other issues that has not yet been fully resolved.
Another issue that has proved controversial is the process for the
supervision of the administrator. The 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy
Law established an office called the "supervisor.""' 7 Article 62 of the
2002 draft provided that the creditors' meeting could select up to three
supervisors. One of the weaknesses of the 2002 draft was that it was
unclear what the lines of demarcation were among the supervisors, the
People's Court, and the creditors' meeting in supervising the
administrator.1 8 The October 2004 draft makes important improvements
in this area. The office of the supervisor has been abolished. In its place,
a creditors' committee has been established. Article 62 of the October
2004 Draft Bankruptcy Law provides that the creditors' meeting may
select up to nine members, who then need to be affirmed by the court. 19
Members may include creditors or their representatives, and must include
at least one worker or workers' representative. The creditors' committee
is intended to play much more than a merely symbolic role in the
process. 120 Article 63 provides that the creditors' committee shall
supervise the management and handling of the debtor's property and is
entitled to request the administrator to make explanations or to supply
relevant documents. The committee may seek rulings by the People's
Court where an administrator violates the bankruptcy law and refuses to
accept supervision. In addition, Article 64 of the October 2004 draft
requires the administrator to report in a timely fashion on twelve major
activities to the creditors' committee. These activities include, inter alia,
transferring the ownership of real property, transferring property rights,
transferring all of the company's stock or business operations, and
requesting the performance of a bilateral contract. If the administrator
wants to undertake an activity specified in Article 64 before the
convening of the first creditors' meeting, and thus before the creditors'
committee has been formed, then the administrator is required to obtain
permission from the People's Court.' 2' Article 20 of the October 2004
draft also provides that the administrator must appear before the creditors
to report on his activities and answer any enquiries.
The creation of the administrator post will have a significant
effect on the bankruptcy process in China. This movement away from
government control (through the membership of the liquidation
committees at present) is to be welcomed. Independent experienced
16 Wang, supra note 102, at 2.
117 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law, Chapter V, § 2.
118 See Booth & Chiu in the note referenced in the title of this article.
19 A creditor chairs the creditors' meeting. October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 55.
The same was true under Article 55 of the 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law.
120 Wang, supra note 102, at 3.
121 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 24.
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insolvency professionals will be more likely to gain the confidence of
creditors. The proposed law also strikes the proper balance among the
administrator, the court, and the creditors. The creation of a creditors'
committee should make the process more transparent and keep creditors
well informed. Active committees will help ensure that administrators
perform efficiently and comply with the new procedures. It will be
interesting to see to what extent foreign creditors (especially foreign
banks) choose to participate in the process and seek appointment to the
committee.
It has been noted that after implementation of the new bankruptcy
law, "bankruptcy administration will emerge as a new profession in
China." 122 In the short term, a key goal will be to find qualified
individuals and institutions willing to serve in this capacity. Foreign
accounting and law firms with expertise in these matters in other
jurisdictions will likely seek to be appointed. However, in the long term
it is crucial that China develop expertise domestically. China needs to
establish a training and education program for potential administrators as
soon as possible after the enactment of the new laws. 23 Another way to
address this problem would be for the government to take a leading role
and create a new administrative agency within China with the
responsibility for administering bankruptcies, akin to the Official
Receiver's Office that exists in many jurisdictions. The responsibilities
of this office could include assisting with regulatory matters, such as
licensing administrators and monitoring administrators in bankruptcies.
In the first few years, the office could also actually provide staff to serve
as administrators in bankruptcy cases, or at least in cases with insufficient
assets to attract members of the professions.1
24
Vietnam
Under the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, once the court
decided to proceed with the bankruptcy case (under Section 15 of the
1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law), the debtor continued to manage the
enterprise subject to the supervision of the court and a trustee
committee 125 (which was also called a "property management team" or an
"asset management team"). After making the decision to proceed with
the bankruptcy case, the court would initiate a mandated conciliation and
reorganization process. If the conciliation and reorganization stage did
not succeed, the court would declare the business bankrupt pursuant to
Section 36 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. Pursuant to Section
42, upon the making of the declaration of bankruptcy, a property
122 Wang, supra note 102, at 4.
123 See Booth, Lees, Pitney & Tabb in the note referenced in the title of this article, at 7.
124 id.
125 See 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law §§ 17 (trustee committee), 18 (court).
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settlement team (also called an asset liquidation team or property
realization team) would be created and would be permitted to include
members of the property management team. In theory, the first stage
appears to include a modified debtor-in-possession reorganization
procedure, but the reality under the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law
was that "the opening of bankruptcy proceedings [was] for the purpose of
liquidation rather than rehabilitation of the insolvent enterprises.", 12 6 Thus,
one of the unique aspects of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law was
the adaptation of a modified debtor-in-possession approach to
bankruptcy.
Article 17 of Vietnamese Decree 189 provided that the trustee
committee was to consist of an officer of the Economic Court nominated
by the Chief Justice of the provincial People's Court as the Chairman, an
enforcement officer of the Judgment Execution Office nominated by the
head of the Judgment Execution Office, 127 the creditor holding the largest
debt, a representative of the debtor, a trade union representative, a
representative of the Department of Finance, a representative of the
provincial state bank, and, as necessary, experts from other specialist
branches. 28 The 1993 law did not intend for the trustee committee to
participate in and interfere with the running of the enterprise, which was
still the responsibility of the enterprise's management. 129 Other functions
(e.g., to enforce the bankruptcy judgment over the enterprise) were
carried out later (after the making of the bankruptcy declaration) by the
property realization team, which was also comprised of government
officials and creditor and debtor representatives, who could also have
served on the property management team. 130 These teams with their
hybrid composition exercised functions that in other jurisdictions are
normally exercised by trustees (or administrators), and, in a few
instances, by creditors' committees.
The administrative structure from the 1993 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law carried over into the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy
Law. Section 59 of the 2002 draft modified old Section 18.1 of the 1993
law and provided that as of the date the court issues the decision to handle
the petition for settlement in bankruptcy, the power to manage the
indebted merchant's assets would vest in the asset management team.
Section 16 of the 2002 draft modified old Section 17. The basic structure
of the asset management committee was quite similar, although the
126 See VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Two, II, 1.1.1
and discussion in infra Part IV.
17 This office is based in the executive branch, not the judicial branch. VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY
LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part One, III, 1.7 ("Execution of the enterprise
bankruptcy decision is the job of the executive branch").
'28 Id. at Part One, III, 1.6 ("Asset management of debt burden enterprise is carried out by a
collective or committee consisting ofmembers representing different interests").
129 Id.; see also 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law § 18.
130 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law §§ 42, 44.
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composition changed somewhat from that set out in Article 17 of
Vietnamese Decree 189. The asset management team was to consist of
the following: court staff; the bailiff of the Judgment Execution Office or
Judgment Execution Group; up to three creditors' representatives 131
(although it appears from Section 75.1 .c of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law that both the court and the creditors each were to choose
three representatives and that in the case of a conflict the court was
empowered to override the creditors' choice and appoint its own
representatives); a labor union representative or an employee's
representative if there was no labor union; and officials of financial,
banking and other professional offices. The head of the asset
management team was to be a member of the court's staff.1 32 Section 16
empowered the asset management team to do the following:
a) make the list of all of the assets of the indebted merchant;
b) supervise and examine the management of assets by the
merchant (including when necessary, the power to request
the judge to issue provisional measures to preserve the
remaining estate of the merchant);
c) compile the list of creditors and debts that should be paid
to each creditor; and
d) enforce the judge's decisions during bankrupt settlement.
The modified debtor-in-possession approach from old Section
18.1 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law was retained in Section 59
of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. Section 59 provided that
the indebted merchant would ordinarily conduct its business activities
subject to the supervision and monitoring by the judge and the asset
management team. In a change from the 1993 law, it also provided that
the indebted merchant's assets would vest in the asset management team.
Section 17.3 of the 2002 draft provided that the asset liquidation
team was to consist of bailiffs and officials of the judgment execution
office or judgment execution group; representatives of financial and
banking offices at the corresponding level; a creditor's representative;' 33 a
labor union representative or employees' representative where a labor
union does not exist; and a representative of the indebted merchant.
Pursuant to Section 17.1 of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law,
the enforcement of the liquidation decision over the indebted merchant
was under the power of the Judgment Enforcement Office or Judgment
Enforcement Group where the main merchant's address as prescribed in
the merchant's business certificate was located. The asset liquidation
131 This is specified in 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law § 75.1.c.
132 Id. § 16.1.
133 However, in contrast to the creditors' representative on the asset management team, it is not
specified how the representative is appointed and whether there can be more than one.
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team was given the following powers and duties pursuant to Section 19 of
the 2002 Vietnamese Draft Bankruptcy Law (a revised version of old
Section 44 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law):
1) to receive assets and the relevant documents transferred to
it by the asset management team;
2) to recover and manage all of the assets, documents,
accounting books and seal of the merchant who was
declared bankrupt;
3) to discover the indebted merchant's assets and request the
head of the asset management team to recover them or the
value of the assets or the difference in the value of the
assets that were sold or transferred illegally in accordance
with Section 20 (pursuant to the exercise of avoidance
powers). The asset liquidation team shall recover the
assets, the value of the assets, or the difference under the
decision of the head of the asset liquidation team;
4) Based on the decision of the head of the asset liquidation
team, to organize an auction of the indebted merchant's
assets;
5) To deposit all money received of the merchant who is
declared bankrupt into newly opened bank accounts; and
6) To implement the liquidation in accordance with the
decision of the judge.
The 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, pursuant to Article 9,
merged the asset management and liquidation teams into one committee
called the "trustee committee." The judge is to establish this committee at
the time he makes the decision to commence bankruptcy proceedings.
The members of the trustee committee are to include an officer of the
court, an enforcement officer of the Judgment Execution Office of the
same level (who is to act as Chairman of the Committee); a representative
of the creditor (not necessarily the largest); 134 a representative of the
debtor; and, as necessary, a representative of the trade union; a labor
representative; and representatives of the relevant professional agencies.
The basic structure is the same but there have been some important
changes. First, an officer of the court no longer chairs the committee.
Rather, that function is exercised by an officer from the judgment
enforcement body, which is part of the executive branch. Second, the
mandatory membership of the committee has been decreased and
representatives from various governmental departments no longer
automatically serve on the committee.
134 Pursuant to Article 64 of the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, it appears that there is only one
creditor's representative on the committee and that the creditors are able to vote on the replacement.
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The duties and powers of this unified committee combine the
duties and powers of the two previous teams under the 2002 Draft
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, with only two main changes: (1) the
implementation of a plan of asset distribution as may be directed by the
judge has been added to the list, and (2) and in some of the duties and
powers, the reference to the head of the asset management team or the
asset liquidation team has been changed to the judge. Lastly, under the
2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, as under the 2002 Draft Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law, the judge in charge of the bankruptcy proceedings
chairs the meeting of creditors.'
35
Pursuant to Article 30 of the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law,
the modified debtor-in-possession approach continues subject to the
supervision and inspection by the judge and the trustee committee,
although the vesting language from the 2002 draft has been deleted.
However, an important innovation of the 2004 law is that Article 30.2
provides that where it is considered that the manager of the enterprise of
cooperative is incapable of operating the business, or his operation does
not benefit the preservation of the assets of the enterprise or cooperative,
the judge, upon request from the creditors, shall make a decision to
appoint a person to manage and operate the business activities or the
enterprise or cooperative. This "manager" would be subject to the
supervision and inspection by the judge and the trustee committee.
It is a positive development that the head of the trustee committee
is no longer a member of the court's staff and that government
departments are no longer automatically on the committee, but this
committee lacks the professional expertise and independence that the
administrator will bring to the Chinese proceedings. The Vietnamese
acknowledge that one of the reasons for adopting a modified debtor-in-
possession approach is that the trustee committee does not have the
necessary knowledge to manage the assets and run the enterprise at the
same time.136 It will be interesting to see if the manager position proves
attractive to creditors and if the manager "exception" in Article 30.2
becomes the norm and eventually replaces the modified debtor-in-
possession approach. If the manager position were utilized in practice, it
would be helpful for the Vietnamese courts to follow the Chinese
example and appoint independent insolvency professionals. Well-
qualified, experienced managers would be able to compensate for many
of the weaknesses of the trustee committee.
135 See 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 61.4; 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 72.
In contrast, it is proposed under both the 2002 and October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Laws
that a creditor will chair the meetings. See October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art 22.
136 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part One, III, 1.6 ("Asset
management of debt burden enterprise is carried out by a collective or committee consisting of
members representing different interests").
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Creditors are involved in the process through representation on
the trustee committee and participation in the creditors' meetings, but this
involvement will not provide as much oversight and supervision as the
creditors' committee is intended to do in China. Vietnam would be well
advised to separate the functions and membership of the trustee
committee and create a distinct creditors' committee.
The judge in Vietnam has historically played the "central and
decisive" role 137 in bankruptcy proceedings - from appointing the
members of the trustee committee to chairing the creditors' meeting. It
has been argued that this has been "suited to the social-economic and
cultural situation" of Vietnam. 138 However, at this stage in the
development of the Vietnamese bankruptcy law, it would be better for the
judge to play a less central role, or, at a minimum, to relinquish some of
the administrative functions such as chairing the creditors' meeting. It is
a positive change that court staff no longer chairs the trustee committee,
but it would be even better if an officer of the court did not even serve on
the committee. In contrast to the checks and balances that have been built
into the proposed Chinese law, the Vietnamese procedure still lacks
independent functionaries and an adequate supervisory structure.
V. CORPORATE REHABILITATION
Corporate reorganization is possible under both the 1986 Chinese
Bankruptcy Law and the PRC Civil Procedure Law, but the number of
cases is very low. 13 9 The situation was similar under the 1993 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law.140 A major impetus for the enactment of new insolvency
laws in both China and Vietnam was to put in place more user-friendly
corporate rescue procedures.
China
Existing Chinese bankruptcy law provides for corporate rescue,
but there are very few provisions. Part 4 of the 2002 Supreme People's
Court Provisions (Articles 25-30) and Part IV of the 1986 Chinese
Bankruptcy Law (Articles 17-22) include provisions regarding
conciliation (also called reconciliation, mediation, settlement,
composition, or compromise) and reorganization. The PRC Civil
Procedure Law also includes one provision on conciliation (Article 202).
The laws also include separate provisions on approval by the creditors. In
.. id. at Part One, III, 1.5 ("The Court - the central subject, playing a decisive role in the
bankruptcy proceeding in Vietnam").
138 id.
139 See Wang, supra note 11, at 220 (the number of cases invoking the reorganization provisions in
the law was close to zero).
140 id.
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cases involving both SOEs and non-SOEs, after the court accepts the case
and before the case is concluded, the debtor may apply to the court for
conciliation. Alternatively, the People's Court itself, in the course of
trying the bankruptcy case, may propose a settlement to the parties. 141 The
creditors may not commence the conciliation process. If the debtor and
creditors reach a settlement agreement (e.g., to reduce the amount to be
paid to the creditors) and the People's Court approves the agreement
before a declaration of bankruptcy has been made, the bankruptcy
procedure is stayed.142 If agreement among the debtor and creditors and
the approval of the People's Court occurs after the declaration of
bankruptcy, the People's Court shall stay the enforcement of the
bankruptcy declaration ruling and stay the bankruptcy procedure. 143 If the
debtor later fails to discharge all of its debts in accordance with the
settlement agreement, the creditors may apply to the People's Court for
enforcement. 144 If the debtor fails or is unable to perform the settlement,
the creditors may apply to the People's Court to resume the bankruptcy
procedure. In addition, in cases where the settlement was reached prior to
the declaration of bankruptcy, the People's Court shall simultaneously
rule to declare the debtor bankrupt when ruling to resume the bankruptcy
procedure. 14
5
Reorganization is a more formal process that may only be used
for SOEs and only in cases in which a creditor filed the bankruptcy
petition. Where the SOE has a superior department in charge, only the
government department may apply for reorganization and must file the
application within three months of the date the People's Court accepts the
bankruptcy case and before the People's Court makes the bankruptcy
declaration. 146 Where the SOE does not have a superior department in
charge, the SOE's shareholders' meeting may pass a resolution and apply
for reorganization and persons designated by the shareholders' meeting
shall undertake the reorganization.1 47 Pursuant to Article 18 of the 1986
PRC Bankruptcy Law, the reorganization of an SOE always involves
conciliation; after the application for reorganization is made, the SOE is
required to submit a conciliation agreement to the creditors' meeting.
141 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions art. 25. Through use of the words qi ye (Ai18k)
[enterprise], Article 25 of the 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions would appear to apply to
both SOEs and non-SOEs. This would extend the use of conciliation to SOEs in cases not involving
reorganization. Articles 17 and 18 of the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law only discuss conciliation
in the context of the reorganization of SOEs - Article 18 states that the enterprise must submit a
draft conciliation agreement to the creditors' meeting after an application for reorganization has
been presented. See infra notes 146-157 and accompanying text. The 1986 law is silent on the issue
of whether conciliation can apply to an SOE in a case not involving a reorganization.
142 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions art. 25.
143 id.
14' Id. art. 26.
145 Id. art. 27.
146 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 17; 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions art. 28. The
period for reorganization may not exceed two years. 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 17.
7 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions art. 28.
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During the reorganization, the superior department in charge or the
designated persons, as the case may be, shall periodically report on the
reorganization and the implementation of the settlement agreement to the
creditors' meeting and the People's Court. 48 During the reorganization,
any enforcement against the debtors' property continues to be stayed
pursuant to Article 11 of the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law. Pursuant to
Article 13 of the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law, secured creditors do not
vote at the creditors' meeting and thus act outside the reorganization
process.
Articles 33 and 34 of the 1991 Supreme People's Court Opinion
help clarify the differences between conciliation and reorganization.
Article 34 provides that where an application for reorganization is made,
the draft conciliation agreement submitted to the creditors must set out
sources of capital for debt repayment, a method of debt repayment, and
the term of the debt repayment. In contrast, pursuant to Article 33, the
reorganization plan must include the following: analysis of the reasons for
the enterprise having reached the edge of insolvency; a plan for the
adjustment or establishment of a new management group for the
enterprise; feasibility-concerning measures and reforms to be taken for
the improvement of business management and measures to be taken for
changes in production; methods of reducing losses and increasing profits;
and the term and objectives of the reorganization (not to exceed two
years). Article 34 also provides that where an enterprise being
reorganized requires a reduction of debt, the application shall clearly state
the amount of the reduction required. From these articles, it can be seen
that "[t]he conciliation will focus only on the relationship between a
debtor and [its] creditors regarding [the] payment scheme while the
reorganization will focus on how to improve the economic situation of the
debtor in the future."' 1
49
The insolvency reform process in China has emphasized the
importance of corporate rescue. Chapter VI of the 2002 draft applied to
reorganization and Chapter VII to conciliation. To highlight their
importance, they appeared before the liquidation chapter, Chapter VIII.
In the October 2004 draft, these chapters have been renumbered as
follows: Reorganization, Chapter VII; Conciliation, Chapter VIII; and
Bankruptcy Liquidations, Chapter IX.
Debtors will be able to choose whether to file for reorganization
or conciliation. 50 Under the 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law,
conciliation was available to all entities subject to the new law, but
reorganization was limited to legal person enterprises. There was a
general view that conciliation would be more useful for partnerships and
"' Id. art. 29. See also 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 17-18.
149 See YU & Gu, supra note 17.
130 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 9.
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sole proprietors. However, with the October 2004 Draft Bankruptcy Law
now limited to legal person enterprises, this distinction is no longer
relevant. The simpler conciliation procedure might appeal to smaller
enterprises or to less complicated cases in which the debtor is confident
that an agreement can be reached quickly.
Under the October 2004 draft, the commencement of a
reorganization will no longer also trigger a formal conciliation procedure.
However, as will be seen in the discussion below, the reorganization plan
incorporates the factors that are included in the conciliation agreement
under the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law.
Chapter VII dramatically broadens the scope of debtors that may
use reorganization, as well as the range of parties that may petition for the
procedure. No longer will reorganization be a procedure limited to SOEs
to be used at the discretion of the government (or the shareholders in the
absence of a superior department in charge). All legal person enterprises,
both SOEs and non-SOES, will be able to utilize the procedure. 151 The
October 2004 draft does not require the petitioner to specify the relief
sought at the time of petitioning, and, where relief is not requested,
certain parties are permitted to make a request after the court accepts the
case, but before the declaration of bankruptcy. Article 9 of the October
2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law' 52 provides that either the debtor or
the creditors may file a petition. A debtor may file an application for
bankruptcy with the People's Court if (1) the debtor is unable to pay its
debts when due, and (2) the debtor's assets cannot pay all of its liabilities
or obviously lack the ability to pay them. 153 The balance sheet test in the
second prong of this clause unfortunately inserts some uncertainty into
the process. In contrast, a creditor may file a petition relying on the
debtor's inability to pay its debts when due.' 54 Article 65 of the October
2004 draft 55 provides that either the debtor or the creditors may apply for
reorganization at the time of petitioning or after the court accepts the
case, but before the court declares the debtor bankrupt. Although
shareholders are not permitted under the draft Chinese law to file a
petition, Article 65 permits them to apply for reorganization after the
court accepts the case, but prior to the declaration of bankruptcy, so long
as more than one-tenth (one-third in Article 66 of the 2002 draft) of the
shareholders support the application. The conciliation commencement
procedures are more limited: Article 93 of the October 2004 draft 156
provides that only the debtor may apply for conciliation either at the time
15I d. art. 2; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 65, 66.
152 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 11.
153 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 2, 9. The balance sheet test did not appear in
the 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law. See 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 4 (cash flow
test for both a debtor's and creditors' petitions).
154 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 9.
155 Id. art. 66.
"56Id. art. 95.
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of petitioning or after acceptance, but prior to the declaration of the
bankruptcy case. Creditors may not apply for conciliation.
The period from when the People's Court decides to reorganize
the debtor to the date that the court approves the reorganization plan or
terminates the reorganization procedure is called the protective period of
reorganization. 157 As a general rule, during the protective period of
reorganization, the administrator shall perform the duties and powers
prescribed in Article 23 of the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy
Law 58 and may employ staff to manage the business operations of the
enterprise or ask the debtor to take on management responsibilities. 59
However, a major change included in the new Article 69 of the October
2004 draft provides that in a case in which the debtor files a petition, at
the time of the filing the debtor is allowed to request permission to
manage the assets and continue the running of the business. Subject to the
approval of the People's Court, the debtor may thus be allowed to carry
on under what is basically a modified debtor-in-possession approach.
Where the debtor opts to retain control, if an administrator has already
been appointed the administrator, she must return possession to the
debtor. In such cases, the administrator's role becomes one of
supervising the debtor.'
60
The initial period of protection may not exceed six months, but
upon request of the administrator (or the debtor, as the case may be) and
with the agreement of the creditors, the People's Court may approve the
extension of the protective period for up to an another three months.'
61
During the protective period, secured creditors are stayed from seeking
repossession of their collateral, but they are allowed to seek exemption
from the stay in cases in which their collateral may be damaged or its
value decreased dramatically.' 6
2
During the protective period, to assist the debtor in continuing its
business operation, the debtor is permitted to borrow money; moreover,
subject to restricted use and necessary controls, the debtor is even
permitted to grant lenders during the protective period security interests in
property not yet collateralized. 63 In other words, during this period, the
debtor is able to seek what is often called "post-petition" financing on
" October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 68; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
68.
158 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 29.
159 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 26, 70; compare with 2002 Draft Chinese
Bankruptcy Law (including a provision on hiring staff [art. 70] but no provision on asking debtor to
take on management responsibilities).160 Id. art. 69.
161 Id. art. 77; compare with 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 68 (six months).
162 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 71; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
71. Secured creditors are not bound by the stay in bankruptcy or conciliation. See October 2004
Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 71; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 119-121.
163 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 72; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
72.
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terms that allows the lender to leapfrog over existing unsecured creditors.
There is a variety of other provisions applicable during the protective
period regarding other matters including allowing owners to reclaim
property in the possession of the debtor' 64 and providing for the rejection
or acceptance of executory contracts. 165 Article 77 of the 2004 draft
provides that if the reorganization procedure is terminated for cause
during the protective period, the People's Court is required to make a
ruling declaring the debtor bankrupt. 1
66
Section 3 of Chapter VII pertains to the reorganization plan. The
administrator (or debtor) is responsible for drafting the plan of
reorganization. 167 Article 79 of the October 2004168 draft provides that the
plan must contain the following:
(1) the management scheme of the reorganized enterprise;
(2) the classification of the debts;
(3) the adjustment scheme of the debts;
(4) the repayment scheme of the debts;
(5) the executing time limits of the reorganization plan; and
(6) the supervising time limits of the reorganization plan; and
(7) other schemes that are conducive to the reorganization of
the enterprise.
Debts in the plan are classified in one of four categories: secured
debts; workers' wages; tax debts; or ordinary unsecured debts. 169 The
administrator (or debtor) is required to submit the plan of reorganization
to the People's Court creditors' meeting within six months, but may seek
an extension for up to three months.' 70 After the People's Court receives
the draft plan of reorganization, if after an examination the plan is
deemed to meet the requirements of the new bankruptcy law, the court
shall convene the creditors' meeting to vote on the plan, and at the
meeting the administrator (or debtor) shall make explanations about the
draft plan to the creditors' meeting and answer questions. 171
'64 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 73; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
73.
"55 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 74; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
75.
166 See also 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 77.
167 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art 78; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
78.
168 Compare with 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 79 (2004 draft adds additional factor (6)
and deletes a factor referring to the executor of the reorganization).
169 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 80; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
80.
"' October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 77; compare with 2002 Draft Chinese
Bankruptcy Law art. 81 (plan must be submitted to court within period set by People's Court).
"' October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 81; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
82.
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The creditors shall vote on the plan in the four groups noted
above. Approval requires a majority in number of the creditors in each
group present at the meeting and more than two-thirds of the settled
amount of the debts of the group. 172 The debtors' shareholders are also
allowed to attend the creditors' meeting, but only as non-voting
delegates. 173 The plan is deemed to be adopted where all of the groups
pass the plan.
174
Article 85 of the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law 175
applies in those situations where any of the groups do not approve the
plan. At first instance, the administrator (or the debtor) is empowered to
negotiate with each group that has rejected the plan and allow the group
to vote again after concluding negotiation. If the plan is still not accepted
after the second vote, the administrator (or the debtor) may then apply to
the court for approval of the plan over the objection of the group(s) that
voted against the plan based on the application of further criteria
(including a limited "cramdown" power). Where the creditors have not
approved the plan on the second vote after the negotiation with the
administrator (or the debtor as the case may be) the People's Court shall
declare the debtor bankrupt.
76
Where the four groups have adopted the reorganization plan, the
administrator has ten days in which to apply to the People's Court for its
approval of the plan. 177 Upon receipt of the application, the People's
Court must decide whether to approve the plan within 30 days after
examining it and determining if it satisfies the procedures prescribed in
the new bankruptcy law.
178
When the plan is approved by the court, it is binding over all
debts that were established before the People's Court accepted the
bankruptcy case. 179 The debtor is responsible for the performance of the
reorganization plan, subject to supervision by the administrator. 180 Where
172 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 83; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
84.
173 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 82; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
83.
174 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 84; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
84.
175 See also 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 85.
176 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 86 (where the plan is not approved); compare
with 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 86 (also includes where the plan has not been
submitted).
17' October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 84; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
87.
178 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 84; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
87.
179 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 90; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art.
91.
"0 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 87, 89. In the 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy
Law, a plan executor was to be appointed to carry out this function and the administrator was
permitted to become the plan executor. 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 90.
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the reorganized enterprise is unable or fails to carry out the reorganization
plan, the People's Court shall terminate the execution of the
reorganization and declare the debtor bankrupt. 181 When this occurs, the
creditors may claim in the debtor's bankruptcy for the total of any unpaid
amounts under the plan.'
182
This new reorganization procedure is a major improvement over
current law. It includes the broad variety of provisions that are found in
other modem corporate rescue laws such as U.S. Chapter 11, although in
many places the proposed provisions would benefit from greater detail.
Providing the debtor with the choice between having an administrator or
retaining control might well prove to be one of the proposed law's
strengths, although more thought should be given to situations in which
the creditors would prefer to have an administrator appointed. Even
where the debtor retains control, the administrator will continue in a
supervisory role and, with the administration's insolvency experience,
will contribute greatly to the corporate rescue process. However, it is
curious that the Chinese have decided to include a balance sheet test for
debtors' petitions, as such a requirement will create unnecessary obstacles
to commencing the corporate rescue process.
Vietnam
The rehabilitation process under the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy
Law was very different from the current Chinese procedures. The 1993
Vietnamese law mandated the use of corporate rescue procedures before
an enterprise could be declared bankrupt. Although these corporate
rescue efforts were required both before and after a bankruptcy petition
was filed,1 83 the reality was that petitions were normally commenced for
the purpose of liquidation rather than rescue.' 84 How was it that these
mandated procedures proved so ineffective? The problem under the old
regime revolved around Section 2 of the 1993 law:
A bankrupt enterprise means an enterprise that still faces
financial difficulties or still suffers losses in its operations
after it has applied all necessary financial measures and as a
result, loses its ability to repay debts when they fall due.
Article 3 the Vietnamese Decree No. 189 added the following detail:
18! October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 91.
'
82 Id. art. 92.
183 In addition, voluntary conciliation was permitted in the period after the petition was filed and
before the court decided whether to make a bankruptcy order. 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law §
6.184 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part Two, II, 1. 1.1.
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1. A business is deemed to have shown signs of falling into a
bankrupt situation defined at Section 2 of the [1993
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law] when it has taken losses for
two consecutive years to the point that it is no longer
capable of repaying the due debts and of giving full pay to
its laborers under the labor agreement for three
consecutive months.
2. When signs of a bankrupt situation appear as defined in
Item 1 of this Article, the business shall have to take
financial measures to overcome insolvency. These
include:
a) To adopt a program to reorganize production and
business, exert tight controls of expenditures, and find
outlets for its products;
b) To take measures to handle commodities, products,
and materials in stock;
c) To recover misappropriated loans and properties;
d) To negotiate with creditors to delay payment of debts,
to assure loan transfers or guarantees, and to reduce or
write off debts; and
e) To seek sources of funding and loans to pay the due
debts and to invest in technological renewal.
3. After having taken the necessary financial measures
mentioned in Item 2 of the Article, if the business is still
not out of difficulties and cannot overcome insolvency
then it has fallen into a bankrupt situation and must be
dealt with as prescribed by the [1993 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law] and this Decree.
Thus, before an enterprise could even be eligible for bankruptcy
relief, it already had to have exhausted "all financial measures" including
out-of-court rescue and negotiation strategies to address financial losses
over a consecutive two-year period. This policy was open to
manipulation by enterprises that wished to avoid bankruptcy: they would
conceal the fact that they were bankrupt and delay the filing of the
petition. 185 It also created a two-year moratorium on the ability of
creditors to push recalcitrant enterprises into bankruptcy. The delays
were even longer in many cases, leading to situations where there were
few remaining assets when the bankruptcy was eventually declared. 186 At
'
851d. at Part Two, II, 1.2.1.
186 See, e.g., the discussion of the case of the SOE Quang Nam Da Nang Meat Export Company in
id. at Part Two, 1I, 3.1.1 ("Dealing with insolvent enterprises by bankruptcy proceedings").
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times, there was not even enough to cover the costs of the bankruptcy
fees.
187
The situation was exacerbated by the courts' application of the
relevant provisions in the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law once a
petition was filed. After a bankruptcy petition was filed, the court,
pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law,
was required to determine whether the case should be dismissed or the
court should proceed with the petition. This decision required an
application of Section 2. It was not uncommon for enterprises to be given
the opportunity to implement necessary financial measures. 188 In many
other cases, petitions were rejected "merely due to the failure by the
applicant to comply with the required formalities, such as insufficient
accounting books, records and documents necessary for determining
losses or financial difficulties, or lack of accounting certification."'189 Yet
other applications were dismissed because the enterprise's losses resulted
from illegal or fraudulent activity and therefore the enterprise was not
eligible to use the bankruptcy procedures.
190
Section 6 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law provided that
"voluntary conciliation" could be attempted between the creditors and the
debtors after the filing of the petition and before the judge decided
whether to proceed with the petition. Moreover, pursuant to Section 20 of
the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, after the court issued the decision
to proceed with the bankruptcy case, the court then initiated the
mandatory corporate rescue process. 191 This has been identified as a
"unique" feature of the old Vietnamese bankruptcy law. 192 The court
would request the owner or legal representative of the enterprise to
prepare a conciliation proposal and restructuring solutions for
restructuring the operations of the enterprise. The time limit for
completing the restructuring would be set by the creditors' meetings, but
in any case could not exceed two years from the date the creditors agreed
on the conciliation proposal. The conciliation measures and restructuring
solutions had to include detailed terms and a plan of implementation for
the measures to reorganize the business and to reduce and repay debt.'
93
The parties had only 60 days from the date of the judge's request to
forward the judge the conciliation proposal and restructuring solutions.
Where this deadline was not complied with, the judge would enter a
bankruptcy declaration. Where a proposal was forwarded to the judge,
"' Id. at Part Two, 11, 1.1.1. There were no cases in which debt recovery exceeded 30% of the
debts. Id. at Part Two, II, 3.1.1.
"
8
' Id. at Part Two, II, 3.1.1.
89 Id. at Part Two, I, 2.3.
19Id. at Part One, III, 2.1
191 For a detailed discussion of the process under Section 20 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy
Law, see id. at Part One, III, 2.4.e.
92 Id. at Part One, II, 5.2.3; Part Two, II, 1 1.1.
193 Vietnamese Government Decree No. 189 art. 13.
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the judge was required to convene a meeting of creditors, which he would
chair. 194 At the meeting, the creditors would decide whether to approve
the conciliation proposal and restructuring solutions. Approval required a
majority in number and at least two-thirds of the total amount of the
unsecured debts present at the meeting. 195 The judge would then
temporarily suspend the bankruptcy proceedings and the owner or the
legal representative of the enterprise would be responsible for
implementing the plan. 196 Only if the process failed at any of the various
stages could a declaration of bankruptcy be made and a liquidation of the
enterprises' assets commence. 197 Liquidation was the norm.
A comparison of the corporate rescue provisions in Chapter VI,
Section 1 of the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law (and Part II, Chapter
VI of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law) with the 1993
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law yields one major change - old Section 2 of
the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law has been omitted and replaced
with a simple cash flow test for determining whether the enterprise is in a
bankrupt situation. 198 This one change should have a significant effect on
corporate rescue because, as can be seen from the discussion above, the
application of old Section 2 made it almost impossible to rehabilitate an
enterprise under Vietnamese bankruptcy law.
There are also some very important similarities between the 2004
law (and the 2002 draft) with the 1993 law -- most importantly, the
retention of the modified debtor-in-possession approach in which the
trustee committee (asset management team in the 2002 draft) and the
judge supervise the debtor. 199 The 2002 draft modified aspects of the
procedure in the 1993 law, only to be amended in the 2004 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law to a form, in some respects, closer to the original 1993
law. Of course, with the deletion of old Section 2, the new procedure in
the 2004 law will operate quite differently.
The 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law required the
petitioner to "clearly state whether it require[d] the commencement of the
rehabilitation procedure or the liquidation procedure. 2 °0 Section 13 of the
2002 draft provided that where it was found that the merchant was in a
bankrupt situation, the judge had the power to decide whether to proceed
with bankruptcy or rehabilitation. Chapter V of Part II (Sections 78-84)
194 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 28.
195 Id. art. 29.
" Id. arts. 29, 30.
197 Id. art. 30 (the section provides for six circumstances in which the court could make the
declaration of bankruptcy).
198 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 3. For merchants under the 2002 Draft Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law, see §§ 6.9, 52.2.
199 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 30; 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 59.
Article 30 of the 2004 law provided for the appointment of a manager in certain circumstances. See
discussion in Part III of the Article.
200 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 48.1.
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required the judge to hold a trial to determine the matter. At the meeting,
the head of the asset management team would make a report on the
indebted merchant's financial situation, the merchant and creditors would
have the right to present their opinions, and the merchant would have the
opportunity to suggest a solution to deal with the debts and business and
produce a reorganization plan. The judge would then decide which
procedure to pursue. Where the court opted for rehabilitation, the
rehabilitation provisions in Chapter VI of Part II (Sections 85 to 96)
would apply and the merchant and creditors would have 15 days in which
to negotiate and reach agreement on a merchant rehabilitation plan.
Approval of the plan would require a majority of the secured creditors
holding two-thirds of the total value of the secured debts of the creditors
attending the meeting (unlike the 1993 law) and a majority of the
unsecured creditors holding a majority of the value of the unsecured debts
of the creditors attending the meeting. The agreed plan would then be
confirmed by the court.
In contrast, the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law returns to the
procedure in the 1993 law in which the petitioner is not allowed to choose
between liquidation and rehabilitation, but rather files a bankruptcy
petition. 20 1 This change in the filing requirements leads to the second
change, relating to the meeting of creditors. Since the petitioner is not
able to choose between liquidation and rehabilitation, Article 64.1
provides the creditors with that choice. At the first meeting of creditors,
the following must occur: (1) the chairman of the trustee committee must
report on a variety of matters including the financial status of the
enterprise (or cooperative) at risk of bankruptcy, and the results of the
asset inventory; (2) the owner or legal representative of the enterprise (or
cooperative) must comment on the report made by the chairman of the
trustee committee and propose solutions and plans to restructure the
enterprise's business operations and the possibility and term of debt
repayment. °2 After the reports, the creditors must vote on a resolution to
restructure the enterprise or cooperative.20 3 For a resolution to pass it
must get a majority of the unsecured creditors present at the meeting, so
long as the attendees as a group represent at least two-thirds of the value
of the unsecured debts.204 At the first meeting, the judge is also requested
to appoint a person to manage the operation of the business activities of
the enterprise or cooperative, thus ending the modified debtor-in-
possession process.20 5
201 See 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law arts. 13-18.
202 Id. art. 64.1.b. This information was put forth at the judicial trial under the 2002 Draft
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law.
23Id. art. 64.i.d.2
c4/d.
2045d
205Id. art. 64. .e. Under the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law § 87, the debtor-in-possession
stage continued until a plan was approved. When the creditors voted in favor of the rehabilitation
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Once the creditors pass such a resolution, the judge has the
obligation to apply the procedures for the rehabilitation of the business.
20 6
It is at this stage that the business rehabilitation procedures under Chapter
VI commence. Within 30 days of the creditor resolution in favor of
business rehabilitation, the enterprise or cooperative is required to submit
its business rehabilitation plan. 0 7 If more time is needed, it may request
the court to grant one extension for up to an additional 30 days.20 8 The
right to submit the plan is not exclusive, and any creditor or person
responsible for the business rehabilitation of the enterprise of cooperative
is entitled to submit a draft plan. 20 9 Within 15 days of receiving the
business rehabilitation plan, the court must either introduce the plan to the
meeting of creditors for its consideration and decision, or make
suggestions to amend and supplement the plan if it fails to comply with
the plan requirements in Article 69.210 Article 69 provides that the plan
must specify "necessary measures" to assist with the recovery of the
enterprise's business operations, and set out the conditions, term, and
schedules for the repayment of debts. The necessary measures may
include proposals:
a. to mobilize new capital sources;
b. to change production and business goods of an enterprise;
c. to renew production technology;
d. to restructure the enterprise's or the cooperative's
management apparatus and to merge or demerge
production divisions to enhance productivity and
production quality;
e. to re-sell new shares to creditors;
f. to sell or lease unnecessary assets; and
g. other measures not contrary to the law.
211
The court must convene the creditors' meeting within ten days of
deciding to refer the plan to the creditors.212 At this stage, a further
difference from the 2002 draft law arises. At the meeting of creditors, a
plan is adopted where a majority of unsecured creditors holding at least
two-thirds of the total unsecured debts vote in favor of the plan.2 13 Unlike
plan, the asset management team would be dissolved and the supervision of the merchant would be
taken up by the creditors' representatives.
206 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 68.1.
207 Id. art. 68.2.
208 Id.
209 id.
210 Id. art. 70.
211 Id. art. 69.2.
212 Id. art. 71.1.
21 Id. art. 71.2.
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the proposed 2002 draft, the 2004 law does not provide the secured
creditors with the opportunity to vote on the plan.
After creditors approve the plan, the judge shall adopt the
resolution. As under the 2002 proposals, it is at this stage that the trustee
committee (asset management team under the 2002 draft) is dissolved and
creditors become responsible for supervising the implementation of the
plan. 21
4
The Vietnamese reorganization procedure will benefit immensely
from the deletion of the old Section 2 requirement. Rescues will now be
possible. However, unlike the Chinese model, the new Vietnamese law
lacks a "driver" for the process. The professional administrator in China,
whether running the enterprise day-to-day or supervising management,
will almost certainly prove more effective than the trustee committee in
Vietnam.
Another party missing from the reorganization process is the
secured creditor. Where a secured creditor has a lien or mortgage over
assets necessary for carrying on the business of the enterprise of the
cooperative, problems are very likely to arise since a secured creditor is
entitled to have its debts settled by its mortgaged assets (pursuant to
Article 37 of the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law). In practice, before
attending the first meeting of creditors, the chairperson of the trustee's
committee should meet with the secured creditor to get the creditor's
consent to release the asset for use in the reorganization. Where the
trustee is unable to secure the consent/participation of the secured
creditor(s), the secured creditor(s) in essence will have veto power over
the process.
VI. PRIORITIES IN DISTRIBUTION AND THE PROTECTION
OF EMPLOYEES' INTERESTS
Asset distribution to creditors in bankruptcies in China and
Vietnam historically has been complicated by the need to protect the
workers of insolvent SOEs. This special protection has been necessary in
the absence of well-developed social security systems.
China
Pursuant to Article 32 of the 1986 Chinese Insolvency Law,
secured creditors enjoy a right of priority over unsecured creditors to the
extent of the level of their security. Article 37 of the 1986 Bankruptcy
Law provides that after paying the expenses of the winding up, the order
of priority among unsecured creditors is as follows:
1
14 Id. arts. 72, 73. See supra note 205.
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(1) employees' wages and labor insurance expenses owed by
the insolvent enterprise;
(2) taxes owed by the insolvent enterprise; and
(3) insolvency claims (claims of the unsecured creditors).
Where there are insufficient assets to satisfy all of the claims within the
same ranking, Article 37 provides for the assets to be distributed pro rata
within that ranking. Articles 56 to 58 of the 2002 PRC Supreme People's
Court Provisions provide that the first priority for worker's claims in
Article 37(1) above includes severance pay owed to workers whose labor
contracts are terminated due to the bankruptcy of the enterprise, labor
compensation owed by the debtor to regular non-staff and workers
(including temporary workers), and the pooled funds of the enterprise's
staff and workers owed by the debtor, but not high interest thereon.
From the legislation, it appears that the priority scheme in the
1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law adopts the traditional model. However, in
reality the practice is quite different for SOE insolvencies subject to the
policy decrees that have provided workers' resettlement rights with a first
claim on the land use rights of SOEs in priority to the preexisting rights of
secured creditors.21 5 In thousands of cases, these policy decrees have cut
back on the traditional priority scheme in the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy
Law. In other words, there appear to be two competing priority schemes
in China.
The 2002 draft retained the priority scheme of the 1986 law, with
secured creditors getting paid first up to the level of their security,
followed by the (1) costs and expenses relating to the bankruptcy case
(and public debts or debts of common benefit), 216 (2) wages of
employees, social insurance and other relevant debts as provided under
labor law, (3) tax liabilities, and (4) general unsecured bankruptcy
claims.217 It also retained the rule for pro rata distributions where the
assets are insufficient to pay all of the claims within a single ranking in
full. Supplementing this general priority scheme in the 2002 Draft
Chinese Bankruptcy Law was Article 10:
The People's Court shall safeguard the lawful rights and
interests of the employees of the bankrupt enterprises in
accordance with the law when trying bankruptcy cases.
The People's Government of the place where the bankrupt
enterprise is located shall properly arrange the settlement and
211 See, e.g., the PRC 1994 and 1997 Decrees.
216 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 40 (providing that debts of common benefit are certain
debts generated after the People's Court accepts a bankruptcy ease, e.g., a debt generated as a result
of the administrator's request to perform a bilateral contract).
217 Id. art. 135.
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lifetime guarantee of the rights of employees of the bankrupt
enterprise.
The second paragraph of Article 10 tried to mediate the conflict between
the two competing priority schemes in China, by putting the burden of
providing for the settlement and lifetime guarantee of the rights of
workers on the local governments.
The October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law adopted a
different approach to workers' rights. On the one hand, Article 8 appears
to cut back on the protection of workers' rights - although it retains the
first paragraph of Article 10 of the 2002 draft, it omits the second
paragraph that provided that local governments have the responsibility
to arrange for resettlement and guaranteed benefits. On the other hand,
there is the new priority scheme in Articles 113 and 127 that substantially
expands worker protection under the bankruptcy law.. These articles
provide that where there are sufficient funds to pay workers' claims in
full (including unpaid wages, unpaid basic society insurance, and other
payments pursuant to administrative regulations and the law), the
traditional priority ranking will apply. However, where workers' claims
cannot be paid in full, the workers get first priority over the prior rights of
secured creditors from the assets securing the secured creditors' claims.
This amendment has taken many people by surprise, especially in
the light of the proposal accompanying the October 2004 draft that
provides that over the next few years certain SOEs will be subject to
"administrative closure" procedures pursuant to regulations to be
prescribed by the State Council.218 These "administrative procedures" are
intended to address the special problems faced by SOEs, including
resettlement and the guarantee of lifetime benefits. When this period
expires and all SOEs are subject to the new law, there should be few
SOEs that will need special treatment for their workers. It is thus even
less understandable why the October 2004 draft proposes to give workers
a special priority right that even exceeds in many respects the treatment
that workers get under the government policy decrees. This proposal
goes beyond the decrees in three ways: (1) all workers are covered, not
just employees of SOEs; (2) the claims apply to a broad range of claims
and not to a specific type of claim (i.e., resettlement rights); and (3) the
priority extends to all of the property of the enterprise and not just the
land use rights. Where the workers cannot get paid in full, the burden
will fall on the secured creditors. If these provisions are enacted into law,
they could have an adverse consequence for bank lending in China and
lead to higher borrowing costs. Further details are needed as to the scope
of the claims that are protected by this new priority scheme. It is hoped
that this change in the priority rules is not symptomatic of a more
218 See text accompanying supra notes 64-66.
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significant policy shift in the October 2004 draft in favor of protecting
workers. It would be unfortunate if the People's Courts were to interpret
Article 8 as broadly supporting a judicial discretion not to accept a
bankruptcy case where it appeared that there were insufficient assets to
pay workers in full under Articles 113 and 127.219
Vietnam
The 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law adopted the same priority
scheme as in the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law. Pursuant to Section 38,
secured claims were entitled to be paid first up to the level of the value of
the security. The priority scheme listed in Section 39 of the 1993 law
provided for payment from the assets of the estate to be as follows: the
costs and expense of the bankruptcy proceedings; labor claims (defined as
covering unpaid wages, termination of employment allowance, social
insurance as determined by the law and other rights pursuant to a
collective or individual labor agreement); tax claims; and then general
unsecured creditors.
The 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law adopted this same
scheme. Section 26 preserved the secured creditors' right to be paid in
full up to the value of its security and Section 27 set out the same priority
scheme for the preferred classes of creditors. The 2002 draft also
included a new Section 28, which provided that claims at the same
preferential rank should be paid proportionally based on the value of each
claim.
Unlike the recent Chinese proposals, the 2004 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law does not give workers any special protection greater
than the priority under existing law. Article 35 of the 2004 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law retains the priority for secured creditors over other
creditors up to the value of the secured creditors' collateral and makes it
clear that the payment will come from such assets. Bankruptcy expenses
and workers' benefits also retain their order of priority pursuant to Article
37. However, the overall priority scheme in Article 37 deviates from its
predecessor provisions by omitting any priority for tax claims. This
change is in accordance with the modem trend in favor of cutting back on
the categories of preferential claims in favor of maximizing payments to
general unsecured claims.
219 See Campbell, Korff & Eu Jin Chua, China Sets Short Timetable for Bankruptcy Law Reform,
18(8) CHINA L. & PRAC. 21, 21 (Oct. 2004) (raising a more general concern about the exercise of
judicial discretion to protect workers' rights under the June 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law).
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VII. CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY ISSUES
Since it is becoming increasingly common for bankruptcies to
have cross-border elements, modem insolvency systems must address
both "inbound" and "outbound" cross-border insolvency issues. In the
Chinese context, an inbound bankruptcy might involve a foreign
representative (e.g., a trustee or a liquidator) who comes to China to seek
recognition of a foreign bankruptcy, with perhaps the intention of gaining
local cooperation in securing assets in China, and ultimately of obtaining
permission to take such assets (or the proceeds from the sale of the assets)
back to her foreign home where the primary bankruptcy proceeding is
being held. An outgoing bankruptcy would involve the opposite scenario
in which a representative from China would go overseas to seek
recognition and cooperation from a foreign court. When considering
these issues, judicial decisions may generally be divided into two
paradigm approaches: the "territoriality approach" and the "universality
approach." If adopting the territoriality approach, a Chinese judge would
refuse to recognize the extraterritorial application of a foreign
jurisdiction's laws and refuse to allow the foreign representative to claim
the assets of the foreign debtor that are located within the Chinese court's
jurisdiction. In contrast, if adopting the universality approach, the
Chinese judge would recognize the extraterritorial application of the
foreign jurisdiction's laws and allow the foreign representative to claim
the assets of the foreign debtor that are located within the Chinese court's
jurisdiction.220
China
At present, none of the national PRC insolvency legislation
includes provisions that specifically apply to the above scenarios.221
When confronted with incoming cross-border insolvency issues, Chinese
courts have traditionally adopted the territorial approach.222 However, the
situation is changing. Hong Kong liquidators have noted that over the
last few years they increasingly have been able to secure the cooperation
of their cross-border counterparts in Guangdong. Moreover, in one of the
series of annual meetings held between Hong Kong and Beijing
insolvency professionals, the Beijing team noted that recognition of a
220 For further discussion of the territoriality and universality approaches, see Charles D. Booth,
Living in Uncertain Times: The Need to Strengthen Hong Kong Transnational Insolvency Law," 34
COLUMBIA J. TRANS'L L. 389 (1996).
221 For a more detailed discussion of Chinese cross-border insolvency law, see Jingxia Sift, Chinese
Cross-Border Insolvencies: Current Issues and Future Developments, 10 INT'L. INSOLVENCY R. 33.
For a discussion of the approach adopted by Shenzhen, see Zhang & Booth, supra note 3, at 24-29.
222 See, e.g., Liwan District Construction Company v. Euro-America China Property Ltd., reported
and commented on by Donald J. Lewis & Charles D. Booth, Case Comment, 6 CHINA L. & PRAC.
27 (1990).
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Hong Kong liquidator might be more likely in a voluntary liquidation
commenced by the company's shareholders or directors than in a
compulsory winding up.
223
The 2001 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law was the first draft that
included a provision on cross-border insolvency, and all subsequent drafts
have as well. Article 8 of the 2002 draft Chinese bankruptcy law
explicitly provided that the draft law applies to a debtor's assets outside
the PRC, and thus adopted a universality approach for outbound
transactions. 224 This provision has been retained in Article 7 of the
October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law. It is a significant step for
Chinese legislation to assert that it is extraterritorial in scope and the
inclusion of such a provision will make it much easier for Chinese
representatives to seek assets. However, this is the only mention of the
extraterritoriality of Chinese bankruptcy law in the draft. Some thought
should be given to whether the avoidance powers should also apply
extraterritorially, as this is a separate issue from whether property
worldwide is part of the estate.225
However, concerning inbound transactions, Article 8 of the 2002
draft was not as clearly universal. Rather, it provided that when, in the
course of the foreign bankruptcy procedures, a foreign party applied for
execution on the debtor's property located in the PRC, the People's Court
may make a ruling of approval, except in the following cases:
a) If there are no relevant treaties or reciprocal relations
between the country and the PRC;
b) If the application violates the public interests of the PRC;
c) If the approval might impair the lawful interests or rights
of the creditors in the PRC; and
d) If there are other factors that the People's Court thinks
ought to be taken into consideration.
Article 7 of the October 2004 draft retains this provision with two
important amendments: (1) subsection (d) has been deleted (which is a
change for the better because subsection (d) gave the local judge open-
ended discretion); and (2) in the preamble, may has been changed to shall.
This also cuts down on the court's discretion and will facilitate more
cross-border cooperation. This provision improves upon existing Chinese
223 Meeting held in Beijing on Apr. 12, 2001. See Zhang & Booth, Beijing's Initiative on Cross-
Border Insolvency, supra note 47, at 36.
224 In a recent case, a Hong Kong court held that China's current insolvency law was universal in
scope and would be given recognition by the Hong Kong court. CCIC Finance Ltd. v. Guangdong
Int l Trust & Inv. Corp. and Guangdong nt 7 Trust & Inv. Corp. Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. (In
Liq.), HCA 15651 of 1999 (July 31, 2001).
225 For a discussion of this issue in the Hong Kong context, see Charles D. Booth & Philip St. J.
Smart, The New Avoidance Powers under Hong Kong Insolvency Law: A Move from Territoriality
to Extraterritoriality, 34 INT'L LAW. 255 (2000).
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bankruptcy law. Significantly, the rhetoric of the section moves away
from the territoriality approach traditionally adopted by the PRC towards
foreign insolvencies. However, due to the inclusion of subsection (a),
Article 7 is unlikely to have much impact for many years because China
has not entered into any relevant treaties or reciprocal relations on this
topic. Not even China and Hong Kong have entered into a bilateral
agreement on cross-border insolvencies.226 This type of provision is
called a "reciprocity provision, 227 and, unfortunately, such provisions
hamper cross-border cooperation.
A further provision that should be included in the legislation is
one setting forth the documents that a foreign representative should
produce to the Chinese courts to prove the existence of the foreign
bankruptcy and gain recognition. This topic has come up frequently in
the annual meetings of the Hong Kong and Beijing insolvency
professionals. Recognition will be more likely if the legislation is very
clear as to what documents must be submitted, who must sign them, and
whether any official stamps are necessary.
Vietnam
Vietnam has not signed any cross-border insolvency treaties, and
the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law did not include any inbound or
outbound cross-border insolvency provisions. However, cross-border
insolvency issues were raised during the drafting process in the context of
dealing with a bankrupt enterprise's assets overseas.228 Section 2 of the
2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law provided that the new law would
apply to merchants operating in Vietnam and to their members operating
outside Vietnam. The intention of this section was to adopt the
universality approach and to assert extra-territorial application of
Vietnamese bankruptcy laws over a merchant's property located outside
Vietnam.229 The Vietnamese were aware that the effect of including such
226 See Zhang & Booth, Beijing's Initiative on Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 47. This is one
issue that the insolvency professionals from Hong Kong and Beijing are discussing.
227 Interestingly, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong has also suggested that recognition by
Hong Kong should be based on reciprocity. THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG,
REPORT ON THE WINDING UP PROVISIONS IN THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE 213 (July 1999).
Although both Hong Kong and China are proposing a reciprocity requirement, they are approaching
that position from different directions - China is moving from a territoriality approach, unlike Hong
Kong, which is cutting back on its more universality-based approach. For a discussion of Hong
Kong cross-border insolvency issues, see Booth, supra note 220.
228 See VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part One, II, 5.4
("Dealing with the bankrupt enterprise's residual assets overseas") (setting out the international
approaches to the topic, but not discussing the Vietnamese position).
I learned this first-hand during the workshops I conducted in Hanoi, Vietnam, in June 2002. See
supra note 14.
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a position would depend on whether foreign countries decided to
recognize the new Vietnamese bankruptcy law.230
Unfortunately, this assertion of the extra-territorial application of
Vietnamese bankruptcy law in the 2002 draft was not included in the
2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. Article 4 of the 2004 law provides
that the bankruptcy law shall apply to all enterprises and cooperatives that
operate in Vietnam, except as otherwise provided in international
conventions signed by Vietnam. There is no language in the Article
extending the law's application to the assets of enterprises or cooperatives
located overseas. Thus, the result is that the new law, like the 1993 law,
is silent on both inbound and outbound cross-border insolvency issues. It
is disappointing that Vietnam did not address these issues in the new law.
Article 4 of the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law is also a
successor provision to another line of provisions in Vietnamese
bankruptcy law regarding the applicability of Vietnamese bankruptcy law
over businesses involving foreign individuals and organizations (FIEs).
Section 51 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law provided that the
bankruptcy law applied to a bankruptcy proceeding against businesses
that involved foreign individuals and organizations except where an
international treaty entered into by Vietnam provided otherwise. Article
2 of the Vietnamese Decree No. 189 further provided that the settlement
of the bankruptcy of a business with partial or entire foreign investment
shall comply with the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law, the Vietnamese
FIL, Vietnamese Decree No. 189, and other legal documents that provide
detailed guidance on the settlement of bankruptcy in conformity with the
specific nature of these businesses except as otherwise provided for in
international treaties. 231 Article 4 has superseded these provisions:
"businesses with foreign individuals and organizations" under the 1993
law are included within "enterprises" under the 2004 draft.
-This matter has also been of concern to foreign companies with
interests in Vietnamese FIEs. Where such foreign companies have run
into financial problems, they have avoided resorting to the Vietnamese
legal system by handling the matter "by way of a change in ownership of
the investor offshore or else an agreement by the offshore liquidator to
sell the equity interest in the Vietnamese licensed venture. 232 In this
fashion, the foreign parties keep the Vietnamese FIE out of bankruptcy in
Vietnam, thereby avoiding the application of the Vietnamese bankruptcy
law.
230 See VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 4, at Part One, II, 5.4
("Dealing with the bankrupt enterprise's residual assets overseas").
31 International treaties have been incorporated into Section 99 of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy
Law, which also incorporated Section 51 of the 1993 law.
232 Vietnam (Chapter 39), in INSOL, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A GUIDE TO RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT 231 (2003).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Drafting a bankruptcy law is never an easy task. The process is
even more difficult for socialist countries with economies in transition
that hope to use the law as an effective tool of market transformation.
The task is further complicated by the conflicting government policies for
giving special protection to the workers of SOEs that were established
during the planned-economy period. Such has been the situation in both
China and Vietnam as they have been reforming their bankruptcy laws.
China's proposed law and Vietnam's recently enacted law
improve upon both countries' legislation. In China's case, it will also
unify the existing bankruptcy law framework. These new laws are more
detailed and comprehensive than their predecessors were, although during
the law reform process some of the early aspirations (e.g., for expanding
the scope of application) have given way to pragmatic conservatism, at
times pulling back from more expansive coverage in the 2002 drafts. In
the case of China, several important issues are still being debated.
China made significant innovations to its bankruptcy
administration and corporate rescue procedures. The introduction of a
professional administrator with the requisite experience and training
should dramatically improve the efficiency of bankruptcies and
reorganizations in China. The further introduction of a creditors'
committee creates a mechanism to increase creditor involvement and
provides a counterbalance to the administrator.
Vietnam adopted a more gradualist approach in which it tinkered
with the basic administrative structure. The trustee committee has
replaced the asset management and asset liquidation teams and the
committee composition has changed, but the system retains much of the
approach of the 1993 law. The major change to the corporate rescue
process is the abolition of the requirement (in old Section 2 of the 1993
law) that before being eligible for bankruptcy relief, the enterprise must
already have exhausted "all financial measures." Its deletion will improve
the corporate reorganization process, but the new Vietnamese procedure
still lacks the checks and balances of the Chinese approach and there is no
"driver" of the process. Perhaps the "manager" post created in Vietnam
will appeal to creditors, and they may be able to use it to transform the
procedure.
It is one thing to say that the new laws are much better (they are),
but quite another to predict that the number of bankruptcy cases will
dramatically increase in the short run (probably not). In the aftermath of
the Asian financial crisis, many countries in the region enacted new or
revised corporate rescue laws, but there has not been a significant
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increase in the number of cases commenced.233 This should not be
surprising. Enacting a new bankruptcy/corporate rescue law is only the
first step. For these laws to attract filings by debtors and creditors
requires the existence and integration of many other factors. Thousands
of professionals need to be trained in the workings of the new procedures
- lawyers and accountants, of course, but also investment and banking
advisors, valuation experts, and others. The judiciary must also be
trained; judges handling bankruptcy cases need to be well versed not only
in bankruptcy law, but also in company law, accounting, and real estate
matters. In addition, the bankruptcy law will not function properly unless
there are effective secured transactions, real property, and corporate
governance legislation in place. Lastly, a corporate rescue culture must
develop. The participants in the process must be willing to work together
and to compromise, with a view to agreeing on the terms of a rescue
proposal. Putting all of these factors in place can take years, if not
decades. In China and Vietnam, this process can now begin.
233 See Report on RETA 5795: Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region, I L. &
POLICY AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 10 (2000).

